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A. NEED FOR THE STUDY
Many recent analyses have highlighted the comparative
strengths of the U.S. and Soviet Navies, emphasizing the im-
portance of naval strategy as an arm of the nation's national
policy. In order to understand the policy decisions which
are made in implementing this strategy, the effects of the
environmental factors on it must be examined by decision-
makers, those who carry out the policy, the general public,
and those peoples of the world who are affected by it.
Study of these environmental factors serves several pur-
poses. Primarily, it enables one to evaluate the reasons for
making the particular decisions. Armed with this insight,
the policy planners and operational leaders can improve their
understanding of the complex issues that are involved in the
decisions they face. Finally, this improved perception of
the comprehensive nature of these policies will provide all
concerned with an appreciation for the need of a more balanced
approach in their definition.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this research effort is to address this
need by providing a background of events and their causes
which will enable the reader to gain an understanding of






The framework of this discussion of naval strategy is
established by the background presented in Chapter II.
Soviet Naval Policy (Chapter III) provides perceptions of the
Soviet Navy's emergence from its inferior position after
World War II to its acceptance as a world naval power today.
While the information from the Soviet Union is incomplete,
the detailed data and pronouncements in Chapter IV concerning
U.S. naval strategy reveal the effect of similar factors men-
tioned in the Soviet chronological study. In Chapter V, The
Effects of Environmental Factors on Naval Strategy, some of
the factors mentioned in the Soviet and U.S. chapters are
reiterated, and others are added to expand the scope of cover-
age. Although a complete list of these factors and an in-
depth investigation of their impact is not presented,
sufficient examples in the context of recent history and
current situations are given to demonstrate the value of
this knowledge to those who must evaluate Soviet naval strat-
egy and establish its United States counterpart.
D. SOURCES
Source material for this subject is extensive. Congres-
sional testimony, national magazines, and professional military
periodicals are among the many sources consulted. In addition,
analyses conducted by the Rand Corporation, Brookings Institute,
and the Center for Naval Analysis are utilized to provide a
balanced viewpoint in the discussions. Special attention is
paid to Michael MccGwire and Robert Herrick, whose invaluable
i

experience as assistant naval attaches to the Soviet Union
has made their detailed analytic efforts essential to a
better understanding of the Soviet Navy's recent rise to
recognition.
II. BACKGROUND—UNITED STATES-SOVIET NAVAL INTERACTION
In order to understand the elements of current naval
strategy and the factors which affect its determination, it
is helpful to review the history of incidents and naval plan-
ning trends which formed naval strategy of recent years.
A. POSTWAR PERIOD
1. Event Summary (1945-1950)
a. 1946
In March the U.S.S.R. not only failed to with-
draw its troops from Iran in accordance with previous agree-
ments, but also moved reinforcements toward the Iranian and
Turkish borders with hopes of gaining control of the Darda-
nelles. Afterwards, the United States announced an alleged
goodwill mission to Turkey by the Battleship Missouri , cruiser
Providence
,
and destroyer Powers . The threat of this naval
force convinced the U.S.S.R. to reach a withdrawal agreement
while Missouri was enroute to Turkey.
At the same time the Communist dominated left
had been strongly rejected in the Greek elections. With the
threat of subversive retaliation imminent, the Missouri made
a courtesy call to Greece after leaving Istanbul. However,
after the American dreadnought left Greece, the Soviets
10

charged that the proposed referendum on the return of the
monarchy threatened peace. This action, plus renewed Soviet
demands on Turkey for a share in control of the Dardanelles,
convinced U.S. Defense Secretary James Forrestal and Presi-
dent Harry S. Truman that the presence of a stronger squadron
was needed in the Mediterranean. A carefully planned news
release on 28 August, which made known the visit of a squadron
composed of the new aircraft carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt
,
cruiser Little Rock , and five destroyers, set the stage for
the successful September referendum. The result of these
early major power confrontations in the Mediterranean was
the permanent presence of American naval power in the U.S.
Sixth Fleet.
b. 1948
Prior to the Italian national elections in April
1948, the Communist Party had attempted to take control through
the intimidation of the populace by riots and demonstrations.
During this period Sixth Fleet ships, operating in Italian
waters, had increased the frequency of good-will visits.
The vigorous Soviet protests of this "gunboat diplomacy"
acknowledged the true importance of this stabilizing naval
influence.
Thwarted by U.S. determination on several occa-
sions, the U.S.S.R. began the Berlin Blockade in April. The
U.S. Navy participated in the famous Berlin Airlift through
the logistic efforts of tankers and auxiliaries in conjunction
with merchant ships. The transportation of over two million
11

gallons of aviation gas for airlift planes, as well as tons
of food and supplies, contributed to the effort that resulted
in the Soviets' lifting the blockade on May 12, 1949.
This series of events encouraged the U.S. and
her European allies to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization (NATO) in April 1949. The alliance realized that it
was imperative to maintain freedom of ship movement across
the Atlantic through sea control by a navy of unchallenged
1
superiority.
2. Postwar Naval Programs
a. Soviet Fleet Expansion
The Soviet Union's postwar naval programs were
directed at both the continuance of the traditional role of
support for the ground forces and defense of the coastal
areas, and the beginning of a new mission of interdicting
free sea communications between the United States and Europe.
The first of these efforts concentrated on expanding the sur-
face fleet with the construction of cruisers and destroyers,
while the second emphasized building up the Soviet submarine
fleet. Nearly 200 modern attack submarines of the W-class
were built in the late 1940'so 2 By late 1950, the Soviet
Navy had grown to substantial size. Its forces included 15
^Rear Admiral Ernest McNeill Eller, The Soviet Sea Chal-
lenge
,
(New York: Cowles Book Company, Inc., 1971), pp. 93-96.
Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Naval Interaction with the
United States and Its Influence on Soviet Naval Development ,
(Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1972), pp. 5-6.
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cruisers, 115 destroyer types, 300-350 submarines and 400-
500 patrol craft. 3
b. Demobilization of the U.S. Navy
Postwar fleet reductions were carried out
swiftly with the concentration on capital ships. With strong
emphasis being placed on the potency of the atomic bomb,
American strategists felt that capital ships and the battle-
tested amphibious assault were no longer feasible. By June
of 1950, 22 of 23 battleships and 13 of 20 carriers had been
decommissioned; the VJ day total of 5,000 ships of patrol
size or larger had been reduced to 671. Thus in a five
year period when the Soviets were rebuilding their naval
strength, the United States had cut back its fleet by 65^.
B. THE COLDWAR ERA
1. Event Summary (19 50-1962)
a. 1950-1953
The Korean War brought mobilization of some of
the mothballed ships that the U C S. Navy required to carry
out amphibious landings and gunfire support. The armistice
and the recent expulsion of the Nationalist Chinese from
mainland China revealed the threat of Communist aggression
that existed in Asia as well as in Europe. Thus the Seventh







Fleet, which operated in the Western Pacific, joined the Sixth
Fleet as a permanent deterrent to any further major power
aggressive acts.
b. 1953-1956
In 1953 selected foreign ports were paid official
visits by Soviet naval units. Between 1954 and 1956 two
Soviet Black Sea detachments visited three countries.
c. 1956
The Middle East threatened to erupt into world
war in July 1956 when Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser
seized the Suez Canal. Later, when Israel's forces drove
into the Sinai Peninsula, Sixth Fleet units were quickly
ordered to evacuate Americans and any other foreign nationals
who wished to leave the area of conflict.
d. 1957
In April 1957, a leftist revolution and the
collapse of certain governing groups endangered King Hussein's
rule in Jordan. President Eisenhower publicly announced the
support of the United States and dispatched Sixth Fleet units
to the Eastern Mediterranean. Later, in September of that
year, a cruiser and destroyer from the U.S.S.R.'s Baltic
Fleet visited Yugoslavia and Syria The stopover in Latakia,
Syria, coinciding with an early part of a national crisis,
gave the appearance of Soviet support.
e. 195S
Once again, political instability threatened a




request for help, the Sixth Fleet maneuvered seventy warships,
including three attack carriers, to the Lebanese coast and
landed marines in Beirut. In August the Soviets established
their first forward base in the Mediterranean when four
W-class submarines and a submarine tender were deployed to
Valona, Albania.
f. 1959
Four more submarines and another tender were
added to the force at Valona.
go I960
A Soviet squadron, on a four week cruise in the
Mediterranean took part in a 20 ship exercise with the Valona-
5based submarines in the Aegean Sea.
h. 1961
As a result of the assassination of President
Rafael Trujillo and the subsequent violence in the Dominican
Republic that occurred in early 196l, American amphibious
ships landed marines in Santo Domingo to protect U.S e citizens
and embassy personnel. At the same time, the pro-Communist
Pathet-Lao insurgents threatened an overthrow of the Laotian
government o President John Kennedy ordered a Seventh Fleet
task force to the area in May, and 1,800 marines were landed,
remaining until early July c Also in May, the Soviet Union
5Michael MccGwire, "The Mediterranean and Soviet Naval
Interests," Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context
,
(Halifax: Centre for Foreign Studies, Department of Political
Science, 1972), pp. 311-312.
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received a setback when it was forced to leave its base at
Valona. Later in December, Admiral Gorshkov, the Soviet
Navy's Commander-in-Chief, made his first visit to Egypt,
i. 1962
The discovery of deployed Russian missiles in
Cuba by U.S. reconnaissance planes precipitated the first
serious nuclear confrontation of the Cold War. President
Kennedy demanded that the missiles and launchers be removed
from Cuba, and also that all vessels enroute with more of
this equipment return to the Soviet Union. These demands
were the elements of a quarantine proclamation which took
effect on 24 October, and were backed up by the 180 American
warships circling the Cuban frontier with 30,000 marines
„
In November the Soviets backed down and dismantled their
. ... 6
missiles.
2 Trends in the Era of Confrontation
a. The Soviets Develop Missile Technology
After Stalin's death in 1953, naval development
proceeded in a different direction with many programs in
progress at that time being cancelled. Pleased with their
advances in missile weaponry, the new leaders were deter-
mined to adopt this technology to their fleet units in an
effort to counter the threat of the American carrier strike
force. The strength and potential capabilities of the U.S.
fleet throughout its interventionary role in the 1950'
s




made the Soviets aware of the need to neutralize this poten-
tial strategic nuclear menace. Their large submarine force
was their best candidate to meet this challenge, and the
Valona-based attack submarines attempted to achieve this in
the Mediterranean during the late 1950's. In their ship con-
struction programs in the latter half of the decade, the
Soviets placed their hope in the development of a variety
of missile systems which could be packaged aboard smaller
surface ships, submarines, and long-range aircraft. This
modernization plan resulted in the evolution of both surface-
7to-surface cruise missiles and strategic ballistic missiles.
b. The U.S. Navy: Intervention Force
Throughout this period the United States
expressed little concern over the rapid development of the
Soviet Navy with the exception of the interdiction threat
that her large fleet of submarines posed. After the demobi-
lization of the postwar era, U.S. involvement in the Korean
War prompted the beginning of a new building program of
large, modern attack carriers. This reaction, which similarly
stimulated the build-up of the Strategic Air Command in the
early 1950*s, resulted in seven new attack carriers being
laid down by 1958 and three older ones being extensively
modernized. The introduction of long-range nuclear capable
aircraft, like the A3-D, extended the operating options of
the carrier task forces and increased the threat to the
'Wolfe, Soviet Naval Interaction with the United States
s Influence on Soviet Naval Development, pp. 12-13.and It_
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Soviet Union. This same carrier force also doubled as the
strong point of all the amphibious interventions which took
place during these twelve tense years.
C. THE MISSILE AGE.
1. Event Summary (1962-1974)
a. 1963
In April the U.S. announced that the Polaris
Fleet Ballistic Missile submarine development was complete,
and that the first submarine was on patrol in the Eastern
Mediterranean. On May 20th the Soviet Union proposed that
the Mediterranean should be declared a nuclear-free zone.
During 1962 and 1963 Soviet naval hydrographic units per-
formed preliminary surveys to provide open anchorage loca-
tions for the initial deployments of surface warships to
the Mediterranean.
b. 1964
During the Cyprus crisis a small force of
Soviet submarines and surface ships made a sustained deploy-
ment to the Eastern Mediterranean. In August two U.S. Navy
destroyers were attacked by North Vietnamese PT boats in
international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin; this incident
caused both houses of the U.S. Congress to initiate resolu-





and to assist those nations covered by the Southeast Asia
Treaty.
c. 1965
The U.S. Seventh Fleet landed 3,500 marines at
Danang, South Vietnam, the first combat troops to enter
Vietnam. This action began full scale U.S. naval involve-
ment in Vietnam that was to last until 1973* Naval gunfire
support, carrier aircraft strikes, and small boat riverine
warfare were the primary operations undertaken by the U.S.
Navy during this period.
d. 1966
Between 1964 and 1966, a gradual increase in
the deployed numbers of Soviet naval vessels in the Eastern
Mediterranean basin was observed. The squadron was usually
composed of two to four diesel submarines, three to five
destroyers or escorts, a gun cruiser and/or submarine tender,
and an occasional surface-to-surface missile capable surface
ship The length of deployment increased each time, but
there were periodic absences, especially during the winter
monthso Soviet warships made three visits to Egypt between
September 1965 and August 1966 and two in 1966 to Algerian
ports. The Soviet Union also provided naval arms and air-
craft to Egypt and Algeria during this period.
e. 1967
In April Communist Party leader Brezhnev
declared that no justification existed for the permanent
presence of the UoS. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and
19

that it was time to demand its withdrawal. During the Arab-
Israeli War in June, Soviet Fleet units shadowed the American
carriers. By this time the average number of ships deployed
by the Soviet Union totalled 25. For the first time, the
rising importance of Soviet naval developments was realized
by the West when a Russian-made Styx missile fired from an
Egyptian patrol boat sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat in
October.
f. 1968
During the year Operation SEVER was held by
the Soviet Navy in the North Atlantic and the deployment of
naval units to the Mediterranean was increased to an average
of 35c This squadron usually consisted of ten to fourteen
surface warships and eight to twelve submarines. Usually
three to four of these combatants were cruise missile armed
units, submarine or surface. 7 Three Soviet warships made
a good-will cruise to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf
portso
go 1970
At the peak of crisis in Jordan in September
and October of 1970, over 72 Soviet naval units were present
in the Eastern Mediterranean to neutralize the presence of
the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Operation OKEAN, a world-wide Soviet
command and control exercise, was conducted by naval and
maritime units throughout the globe. Late in the year the




U.S. government demanded that facilities being built in
the Cuban port of Cienfuegos not be utilized to service
Soviet nuclear submarines.
h. 1971
In support of India in the short Indo-Pakistan
War, the Soviets ordered several naval combatants into
Indian Ocean waters to offset the U.S. carrier force in the
area. In October direct negotiations began between naval
delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union in
an effort to reduce the possibility of tension-producing
incidents.
i. 1972
An agreement to prevent incidents at sea was
signed on May 25th during President Nixon's summit visit
11to MoscoWo By this time the Soviet Mediterranean squadron
averaged 64 deployed vessels. However, a severe setback
was suffered in July when Egyptian President Sadat asked
the Soviet Union to withdraw from Egypt. Even though port
facilities were still available for use, the loss of the
airfields used for fleet surveillance and air cover was a
severe one c
j. 1973
The October War in the Middle East renewed old
rivalries as the Soviets built up concentrations to nearly
Wolfe, Soviet Naval Interaction^ with the United States






one-hundred vessels, and the U.S. went on a world-wide alert
in addition to strengthening the Sixth Fleet. The normal
deployment of 20 Soviet warships to the Indian Ocean aroused
the concern of U.S. strategists who subsequently planned to
expand the Diego Garcia communications station into a base
that could support deployed American ships.
k. 1974
At the request of Egypt, the U.S. Government
undertook the removal of explosives from the Suez Canal in
preparation for its return to full service. The U.S. Navy
dispatched ordnance disposal specialty teams to Egypt aboard
the USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) to carry out this work.
2. UoS. -Soviet Naval Competition
a. Acknowledgement of a World Naval Power
Since World War II, the Soviet naval forces
had largely been restricted to operations in the home waters
of the four territorial fleets: Baltic, Black Sea, Northern,
and Pacific. After observing the significant presence and
intervention of the U.S. in the 1950's, the Soviet Union
felt that it needed to project its power to various strategic
parts of the world in the form of naval power. This resulted
in a gradual shift to the forward deployment of its naval
forces begun during the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Through
the presence of its modern fleet units and the battle test of
its' cruise missile on the Eilat , the Soviet Navy finally was
recognized by the U.S. and other world nations as a serious
threat to their naval and merchant marine fleets. This effort
22

of the Soviet Union to "show the flag" extended, not only into
the Mediterranean, but also into the waters of the Caribbean,
Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans. In addition to this overt
display of missile armed surface ships, a large number of
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines have been deployed
off American shores in an effort to equalize the threat of U.S.
Polaris submarines. From a level of naval mediocrity in 1950,
the Soviet Navy has risen to such a point of strength that Ray-
mond Blackman, editor of the 1972-1973 edition of Janets Fighting
Ships
,
has stated that "it can snap its fingers at all the
maritime countries."
b. Rebuilding an Aging Fleet
The intensive commitment of UoSo naval forces
in Vietnam form 1965 to 1973 has aged the fleet in two ways.
Long deployments with heavy operating schedules prevented
most of the vessels from being maintained properly o Due to
the high expenditure of defense appropriations in Vietnam
during this period, shipbuilding programs were curtailed and
few replacements were provided for aging fleet units, many of
which were built in World War II. The realization that the
Soviet Union had built a modern navy with potent weaponry and
significant numbers, presented the United States with a signi-
ficant challenge to rebuild its fleet. Having just completed
construction of 2+6 units of the Knox ocean escort class, the
U.S. is placing high hopes on the success of the new construc-
tion programs for the DD-963 class destroyer, Patrol Frigate
and SSN-688 high speed attack submarine. These ships are
23

expected to fill a void created by recent extensive decom-
missioning of "World War II vintages. In addition, modern
carrier aircraft and cruise missile development programs are
nearing completion. This rebuilding effort to bridge numerical
and technological gaps is being combined with plans to homeport
fleet units in forward strategic areas such as Greece, Japan,
and Guam. If this challenge was not difficult enough, the
need to accomplish this task under the scrutiny of a skeptical
Congress and under the limitations of an All-Volunteer manpower
concept has allowed little room for misjudgment.
The three decades since World War II have been
characterized by the rise of the Soviet Navy from an inferior
position to its current recognition as a serious threat to
the UoSo Navy. During this period the Soviets developed new
weapons systems and constructed modern warships while the
United States naval effort was concentrated in operating
and interventions from Korea to Vietnam. Just how this
Soviet naval expansion unfolded in the form of programs and
policy is treated next.
24 i \

III. SOVIET NAVAL POLICY
One of the reasons that accurate analysis of Soviet
naval strategy is difficult is the limited amount of infor-
mation that is available regarding the justification of policy
decisions made in the Soviet Union. Probably even more impor-
tant is the actuality that since the Soviet Navy was not con-
sidered a threat for such a long time, its emergence in the
mid 1960's found Western analysts hurrying to find out "what
happened" and "why." Robert G. Weinland addresses this issue
in a paper he prepared for the Center for Naval Analyses, "The
Changing Mission Structure of the Soviet Navy." As a conse-
quence of this sudden emergence he feels that "we are now faced
with considerable uncertainty and large gaps in our knowledge
12
of Soviet capabilities and intentions."
Among the various topics which require investigation to
bridge these gaps of understanding, the study of shipbuilding
programs provides realistic boundary estimates for policy
decisions and allows the linking of political, economic and
strategic causes to these decisions. Commander Michael
MccGwire R.N. (ret.) has contributed a great deal of insight
into the determination of Soviet naval policies since 1950.
His study of the Soviet Navy has concentrated on shipbuilding
1 2
Robert G. Weinland, "The Changing Mission Structure
of The Soviet Navy," in Soviet Naval Developments: Capability
and Context
,
(Halifax: Centre for Foreign Studies, Department




programs and weapons systems development with emphasis on pin-
pointing evidence which might assist in evaluating future
capabilities and courses of action. In "The Turning Points
in Naval Policy Formation" he indicates the advantages of
this approach. A primary benefit of this type of investiga-
tion is the perspective it can provide when appraising the
missions of various classes of ships. With the exception of
directional changes resulting from internal economic causes,
cancellations or modifications may indicate design character-
istics which are considered inadequate and/or irrelevant due
to revised operational requirements. In addition, analysis
of this sort reveals the knowledge and options available to
13Soviet policymakers at a given time. In this chapter, the
analytic efforts of Michael MccGwire and Robert Herrick com-
prise the nucleus of an attempt to formulate a chronological
investigation of Soviet naval policy decisions.
A. STALINIST POSTWAR PROGRAMS
In the forty year period following the Russian Revolution
in 1917, two schools of thought competed for government sup-
port to direct naval strategy in the U.S.S.R. The old school
members were either former Tsarist naval officers or officers
influenced by the classical command of the sea doctrine of
Mahan that this group professed. The capital ships (battleships
Michael MccGwire, "The Turning Point in Naval Policy
Formation," in Soviet Naval Development: Capability and Context ,
(Halifax: Centre for Foreign Studies, Department of Political
Science, Dalhousie University, 1972), pp 152-153*
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and cruisers) and the influential power gained by their deploy-
ment were the basic tenets of their strategy. The young school,
on the other hand, was composed of Marxist-Leninist trained
officers who asserted that the submarine had replaced the large
surface ships of the fleet as the primary striking element.
They believed that submarines, aircraft, and light surface craft
should be assembled to form the contemporary naval fleet.
In spite of persecution resulting from the anti-Communist
inspired Kronshtadt Naval Base mutiny of 1921, the old school
strategists finally persuaded Stalin to support the under-
taking of a capital ship building and modernization program
in 1933. This effort was first hampered by technology problems
and later interrupted by the outbreak of World War II. During
the war, the Russian fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas were
bottled up by German invasions of the North and South, and
because of the need for seaward support of the Soviet ground
troops, naval strategy was limited to coastal defense roles.
The bitter memories of the ineffective use of naval force
in World War II strengthened Stalin's resolve to build the
powerful fleet that the war had interfered with. Shortly
after the war, the Soviets perceived their primary naval
threat to be an amphibious invasion of their Baltic and Black
Sea coastal regions,, This belief was enhanced by the Western
powers' efforts to contain Communism in Eastern Europe and
^Robert Waring Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy , (Annapolis:






the Far East. As a deterrent to this menace the original
rebuilding program provided for 40 cruisers, 210 destroyers,
180 escorts, and 1,200 submarines to be delivered to the four
major fleets by 1965 . While the larger surface ships were
intended for a primary mission of coastal defense in the
postwar era, Stalin had hoped that they would be the nucleus
of a prestigious strike force in the future. Over 180 large
diesel submarines, however, were to be armed for the strategic
delivery of nuclear armed torpedoes. Modification of the
submarine programs by 1950 resulted in the design of four new
classes, two nuclear and two diesel. The nuclear-powered
H-class SSBN and the diesel propelled G-class SSB were to be
15fitted out with ballistic missileso
B. STALIN'S DEATH—A NEW DIRECTION
When Stalin died in March 1953, his long-frustrated
efforts to build an impressive, balanced fleet were about to
be realized. At that time at least six Sverdlov light
cruisers were completed and six others were in progress.
About fifty Skoryi class destroyers were built between 1950
and 1953, and twelve others were in various stages of con-
struction. In addition to the surface ship programs, W-class
1
A
submarine production had been increased. The change in
15Michael MccGwire, "Soviet Naval Programmes," in Soviet
Naval Developments
,
(Halifax: Centre for Foreign Studies. De-
partment of Political Science, Dalhousie University, 1973),
pp. 218-219.
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leadership that followed resulted in the abolishment of the
independent naval ministry and its subordination to the Soviet
Defense Ministry controlled by Army marshalls. Stalin's
successors also re-evaluated national defense policy, and the
seaborne invasion threat was discounted because of advance-
ments in nuclear weapons and missile development.
Program modifications and cancellations in 1954 indicated
a shift in policy back to the young school strategy. The
change from capital ship construction to the relatively
inexpensive submarines, aircraft, and light, fast surface
units allowed resources to be reallocated to the domestic
economy for merchant and fishing vessel construction. The
other key feature of the 1954 decision was the adoption of
long-range cruise missiles (which had yet to be developed),
sacrificing tactical flexibility and fleet size. In 1965,
Premier Nikita Khrushchev replaced Stalin's naval minister,
Admiral Kuznetsov, with 46 year old Admiral Sergei Gorshkov.
Gorshkov, who had been Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy
in 1955, was a former World War II Flotilla commander, and
loyal Party man who was known to have a strong interest in
developing missile technology for fleet use. This postwar
Black Sea Fleet commander had been selected to implement a
totally new operational concept. The new strategic modus
operandi was based on engaging opposing forces (carrier strike
forces included) within the range of land-based air cover,
and envisioned a concurrent missile attack of strike aircraft,
diesel submarines, and light cruisers. Some of the building
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programs originating from this decision were the Badger C
aircraft, Kildin/Knipny/Kynda/Kresta surface ship types, and
the W-class Longbin conversion and J-class diesel submarines.
The wholesale curtailment of the current and projected naval
programs and the shift to the reliance on the long-range
surface-to-surface missile (SSM) systems, which required
17
external target location, meant that these main, task-
specific elements would become closely tied to main fleet
areas and land-based air cover.
C. COUNTERING THE CARRIER-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR THREAT
By 1957 the U.S.S.R. had come to the realization that
development of such American long-range carrier aircraft as
the A-3D made it possible for strategic nuclear air strikes
to be conducted against Russia's industrial areas from the
South Norwegian Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, outside
the range of Soviet shore-based air cover. This reality
shattered the basic assumption of their operational concept
developed in 1954 and called for at least one major change
in their strategic planning. It was also evident to the
Soviets that North American anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
1
7
External target location—the range of the weapon often
exceeded the range of the sensor (radar) necessary to guide it
to the target. Therefore, the missile was either fired to a
predetermined geographic location, or it was fired in the
general direction of the threat where the aircraft took over
guidance to the target.
Material found in sections B and C is based on "Soviet
Naval Programmes,'* "Turning Points in Naval Policy Formation,"
"Developments in Soviet Naval Policy: 1955-1973," and "The
Mediterranean and Soviet Naval Interest," by Michael MccGwire,
and also Soviet Naval Strategy by Robert Herricko
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advances had rendered their first generation of nuclear
ballistic missile submarines, the H-class SSBN, inadequate.
In addition to the fact that the ship's propulsion plant was
noisy and susceptible to detection, the SS-N-4 missile with
350 nautical mile range was subject to severe rough weather
limitations since it had to be launched while on the surface.
This lack of foresight on the part of Soviet naval plan-
ners prompted three major decisions in 1957-195$. The first
was the cancellation of the new surface and submarine programs
established in 1954* Four Kynda-class missile cruisers
and six W-class Longbin SSG units were completed due to
19
"pipeline inertia," while sixteen J-class SSG's were deliv-
ered on a delayed basis between 1962 and 1968. The Kresta-
class successor to Kynda was revised in design to carry a
helicopter aft which could provide target location information
with its radar for the ship's long-range SSM system.
The second decision was to give short-term priority to
neutralization of the carrier over developing nuclear sub-
marine strategic delivery systems. Thus, nuclear hull/propul-
sion units planned for ballistic missile submarines were re-
designed as the E I and E II-class cruise missile units,
making use of missiles developed for the J-class SSG class.
These cruise missile submarines had as their primary objective
"pipeline inertia—a shipbuilding term Michael MccGwire
coined to describe the combination of economic and operational
factors which justify the continued construction of additional
units of a class, for a substantial period after the parent
program has been cancelled.
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the neutralizing of the carrier and other large surface com-
batants. Even then, these submarines still required launch
information from another source for their missile systems.
Therefore, as a temporary measure the existing H-class bal-
listic missile submarine and more than half of the G-class
SSB's were retrofitted with the 65O nautical mile, submerged-
launch SS-N-5 missile system in an effort to offset Western
ASW improvements.
The final decision provided evidence of Khrushchev's
reliance on the nuclear submarine as the cornerstone of a
deterrence-based defense policy. A new requirement for a
threefold increase in nuclear submarine production was levied
for the dual purpose of countering the carrier force in remote
sea areas, and of providing a strategic nuclear delivery
capability in answer to the Polaris program that had begun
development in 1957. The V-class SSN and the C-class SSGN
were expected to meet the carrier threat, with the C-class
submarine to be fitted out with horizon-range submerged-
launch missiles. The Y-class SSBN was to be similar to the
Polaris submarine with sixteen missiles of a 1300-1500 mile
range. All of these classes were scheduled for delivery in
1968. In addition, the development of ballistic missile
submarines by the U.S. created a need to extend the coverage
of land-based anti-submarine helicopters, especially in the
Northern Fleet area. The Moskva-class anti-submarine cruiser
was designed to serve as an ASW helicopter platform with the
first unit expected to be operational in 1965.
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Soviet naval aviation in this period also underwent some
changes in tactics and aircraft. In the early 1950*s the
Soviet Union developed long-range bombers capable of deliv-
ering strategic nuclear strikes against the United States.
The TU-95 Bear and M-4 "Bison heavy bombers reached production
in the mid-1950 's, and were adapted by the Navy for open-
ocean reconnaissance, tanker support, and missile strike roles.
During the immediate postwar period Soviet naval fighter air-
craft were responsible for intercepting the U.S.'s carrier
aircraft. Later in 1959, when the possibility of the
U.S.S.R.'s ever developing a carrier of its own dimmed, these
land based naval fighters were transferred to the land-based
fighter air arm, PVO Strany Q Instead of being charged with
neutralizing the air strike, the navy was now required to
destroy the launch platform. With the Bear assigned to recon-
naissance and missile strike missions and the Bison also
involved with reconnaissance and tanker support for the Bear
,
the navy hoped to reduce its ever-growing enemy ship sur-
veillance problem.
In the 1957-1958 decisions the Soviet Navy proceeded
farther away from the concept of a well-balanced fleet. Even
more important were the subsequent effects on the ship-
building industry which resulted from the sudden program can-
cellations. The Soviet shipbuilding industry itself is
?0
John T. Funkhouser, "Soviet Carrier Strategy," U.S.




relatively flexible, but its services are in great demand.
Merchant marine requirements often compete with the navy for
21the building ways on an equal basis. Lead Time can vary
from three years on initial applications which are very-
primitive (Kildin SSM conversion) to twelve years on a full
application such as the Kresta class which was carefully
designed from the keel up. Because of factors such as pipe-
line inertia and lead time, cancellations can severely delay
building programs when delivery and procurement schedules of
key equipments are upset. The 1954 and 1957-195$ decisions
caused production reverberations until the mid-1960's.
D. FORWARD DEPLOYMENT
1, Building Programs
Until I960 the UoS.S.R. had resigned itself to the
fact that geography had limited it to being predominantly a
major land-power, using its fleets to protect several widely
separated stretches of vulnerable coastline. Narrow straits
or chokepoints had historically enabled her enemies to confine
her Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific fleets in time
of war. Control of the Turkish Straits, which provide the
only exit from the Black Sea, has long been an urgent Soviet
requirement; efforts in 1946 to coerce Turkey to give the
U.S.S.R. regulatory powers over the 192 mile passage were
condemned by the United Nations. This incident, which
21 Another Michael MccGwire term defining the period between
design decision and delivery of the first of a class or of the




prompted the United States to make an interventionary display
of support for Turkey, was one of a series of aggressive moves
in the postwar period that resulted in the formation of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Another strategic
chokepoint is the Swedish-Danish Oresund which severely
restricts access to and from the Baltic Sea. The 1400 mile
voyage from the Baltic to the open ocean of the Norwegian Sea
would present a perilous wartime transit with the threat of
minefields and blockade as experienced by the U.S.S.R. in
World War II. Even the Barents Sea coast in Northern Russia
where the Soviet Northern Fleet is homeported is somewhat
restrictive for units transiting to the North Atlantic. The
Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap is geographically
oriented to permit an effective submarine barrier of ships,
buoys, and aircraft. NATO nations rehearse these tactics in
their annual joint fleet exercises. Thus, the Northern Fleet's
large submarine force could be hampered in its wartime mission
of interdicting ocean supply and communication lines between
the U.S. and Europe. In the Pacific the Soviet seaports of
Vladivostok and Nakhodka have always been confined in the
Sea of Japan. Until the end of World War II Japan had con-
trolled all three straits which served as exits. Soviet
occupation of the Kuriles and Sakhalin in the closing days of
the war with Japan in 1945 gave them control of Kunashiri
22
Strait now named Proliv Yekateriny (Strait of Catherine).
72
Lawrence Griswold, "The Chokepoint War," Sea Power
July 1973, pp. 12-17.
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Because of these strategic geographic weaknesses,
and the continued acceleration of weapons development in the
missile age, the Soviet Union was forced to consider the
extension of its maritime defense zones and forward deploy-
ment of its naval forces. There is some disagreement over
the actual date and cause of this decision which is considered
by many as the most far-reaching policy shift in the history
of the Soviet Navy. Michael MccGwire believes that this
decision was made as early as 196l when the international
climate was tense with incidents such as the U-2 and the
Berlin Wall. The Polaris program successes became apparent
when the first of these ballistic missile submarines sailed
on its first patrol in November I960. Originally 14 of these
vessels had been authorized for construction during the 195$-
1960 period, but on January 29, 196l, President John F.
Kennedy augmented the force with an authorization to build
27 more units, 1$ of which were to commence within six months.
In October of that year, the 1500 nautical mile A-2 missile
for the program was successfully launched, and the more
advanced 2500 nautical mile A-3 was undergoing development.
Specific reference to this increased production was mentioned
in the 1962 edition of Military Strategy , edited by Soviet
23Marshall Sokolovskiio
Michael MccGwire, "Developments in Soviet Naval Policy:
1955-1973," in Soviet Naval Developments
,
(Halifax: Centre for
Foreign Studies, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie
University, 1973), p* 46.
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Even more important than the deployed Polaris system's
coverage of the Soviet Union, was the apparent emphasis on
seaborne strategic delivery weapons. Soviet naval leaders
perceived that the shift to a "nuclear-missile war" at sea
was for the purpose of preserving a ready nuclear reserve
force for dictating terms after a nuclear exchange between
land-based ICBM's. Since the first Y-class ballistic missile
submarines were not to be delivered until 196$, the U.S.S.R.
had to balance the capabilities of its fleet in order to move
toward a level of mutual deterrence. An additional incentive
for action was the eviction of the Soviet submarines from
their Albanian base in mid-196l.
In contrast to this analysis, most Western naval
experts fix the date of this forward deployment as late as
1962 when the massed elements of the U.S. fleet backed up
American demands during the Cuban missile cirsis. The in-
ability of the Soviet Navy to protect its maritime interests
outside of coastal waters was strongly emphasized in this
near nuclear confrontation. MccGwire does not discount the
impact that the Cuban missile crisis had on Soviet naval
policy; however, he feels that the timing of several building
programs and conversions proves that the decision was made
prior to 1962.
Regardless of the exact date of the origin of forward
deployment, the Soviet Navy lacked the overall capabilities
and tactical preparations necessary for such a change of
policy o As a result, the hiatus in surface ship construction
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which had been caused by the 1957-195& decision, was altered
by the urgent requirement for increased numbers of versatile
surface units to diversify the composition of the fleet. The
preliminary design and long lead time procurement of components
for the Krivak class destroyer and Kara class cruiser required
a decision to build in the 1961-1962 time frame. In. the way
of conversions the most immediate need was the attainment of
a surface-to-air missile (SAM) capability on more vessels
than the Kashin class guided missile destroyer which had be-
gun production. The modification of eight Kotlin class
destroyers with SAM systems available from the cancelled
Kynda program was authorized in this period with the first
being completed in 1962. From the nature of the actions
taken, however, Soviet naval leaders seemed to rely on this
interim measure until the nuclear submarine production was
2L.
able to provide the necessary deterrent capability.
In a carefully worded statement in mid-1963 newly-
promoted Fleet Admiral Gorshkov continued his campaign for
more surface ships:
Modern submarines and missile-carrying aircraft comprise
the principal striking forces of the Navy and are the es-
sence of its power. Yet there must be other forces besides
the long-range strike forces both for active defense against
any enemy within the limits of the defense zone of a mari-
time theatre and for the comprehensive support of the combat
and operational activities of the main striking forces of
the Navy. To such forces belong surface missile ships and
small craft, warships and aircraft for antisubmarine warfare,
^IccGwire, "Soviet Naval Programmes,*" p. 220.
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minesweepers, warships and merchant ships of special (KGB
or naval auxiliary) designation, coastal missile units,
etc. 25
By the end of 1964 the Soviets had recognized the need to
oppose Polaris, which was now deployed to the Eastern Medi-
terranean as well as the northern areas. Naval leaders
realized that besides neutralizing the carrier strike threat
with nuclear cruise missile submarines and missile-armed
aircraft, a means of denying free access to potential launching
areas was imperative. The concept of anti-submarine area
defense demanded an increase in ASW surface forces able to
deploy to these forward areas. The conversion of existing
units and construction of more versatile ones for this ASW
role was a long term program compared to the SAM modifications,
but the following steps were taken at this time. The Moskva
class was limited to two units while a multi-purpose successor
was chosen, the Kara class cruiser. The Kresta class was
also modified considerably to be effective in the multi-
threat environment of forward deployment. The long-range
SS-N-3 SSM system was replaced with the middle-range SS-N-10
missile, and the SA-N-1 Goa SAM system was supplanted by the
more advanced SA-N-3 weapon. The overall capability of this
missile cruiser was further enhanced by the substitution of
an ASW helicopter for the target-locating version that had
been essential to the long-range SSMo Another conversion
emphasizing the policy shift was the altering of several





Krupny SSM destroyers to SAM-armed ASW variants renamed the
Kanin class. Whether the decision to build the new Kirov
class carrier with the angled through deck was made during
this period or after the Moskva had operated for a time in
the late 1960*s is yet to be determined.
2. Deployed Operations
The actual deployment of Soviet naval forces was
first limited to short cruises to the Eastern Mediterranean
in 1964. Oceanographic units had preceded these pilot efforts
and had concentrated on surveying anchorages in international
waters where afloat units could receive logistic support and
make repairs. Originally these anchorages were chosen for
their locations out of sight of land because the Soviets
feared the imperialistic overtones of a political action which
would tie their forces to a foreign base. However, by 1965
the lack of afloat support available to the deployed fleet
generated the need for access to base facilities in the
operating area. During that year such factors as the announce-
ment of the conversion of U.S. ballistic missile submarines
to carry the 3000 nautical mile Poseidon missile, increased
American involvement in Vietnam, and the Soviet naval con-
struction increase seemed to convince the U.S.S.R. that it
should pursue a more active projection of its military power.
Soviet naval forces were to adopt a more assertive power and
challenge the West's unrestricted use of the seas, a task




which would demand more ships on station and continuous deploy-
ment. This new direction in strategy, requiring base facili-
ties in forward areas, was probably organized at the Twenty-
Third Party Congress in March 1966. In May, Gorshkov visited
Egypt allegedly seeking base facilities. According to the
1971-1972 edition of Janets Fighting Ships , Soviet military-
aid to Egypt in 1966 included five R-class submarines and
twelve Osa class missile boats. By the time the Arab-Israeli
War began on June 5, 1967, the Soviet's Mediterranean squadron
averaged 25 deployed ships. During the Six Day War these
Soviet units concentrated on shadowing the U.S. carriers in
the Eastern Mediterranean. On 9 July Soviet warships berthed
in Port Said and Alexandria, claiming to provide 'cover'
against Israeli air attacks. The U.S„S.R. had finally
gained the first important bases necessary for the support
27
of forward deployment.
To this singular success the Soviets added another
Egyptian base at Mersa Matruh which included docking facili-
ties and an airfield from which they could fly their TU-16
Badger aircraft. In 1963 and the years that followed, the
size of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron grew significantly
to at least equal the numbers of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Besides
gaining access to other Mediterranean port facilities at
Latakia, Syria and Algeria, B^ne, and Mers el-Kebir in
2




Algeria, the Soviets chose anchorage locations with a definite
strategic objective in mind. In 1971, then Vice-Admiral Isaac
Kidd, the Six Fleet commander, identified these locations as
"choke-points" or "ticket gates" where Soviet fleet units
conduct surveillance. • These areas are east of Gibraltar,
the sea south of Sardinia and Sicily, the Sicilian Channel
between Sicily and Tunisia, between the islands of Crete and
Rhodes, and in the seas off the Greek islands of Kythera and
28Antikythera south of Peloponesuso
A key factor in further Soviet expansion of its
forward deployment was the 1968 British decision, made by
the Labor government of Prime Minister Harold Wilson, to
withdraw British forces from the Perisan Gulf states and
elsewhere east of Suez by the end of 1971. Several visits
were made by Soviet warships to the Persian Gulf and Indian
Ocean in 1968. Today, besides being on good terms with top
oil producing countries such as Kuwait and Iraq, the Soviets
have port facilities available for their use in Hodeida,
Southern Yemen, in Mogadishu and Berbera, Somalia, and in the
islands of the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) and Mauritius.
After the recent support of Soviet fleet units dur-
ing the Indo-Pakistan War when their presence apparently
neutralized the American carrier force sent to the area,
Soviet naval assistance to India has continued. One of the
major Soviet Navy projects has been the construction of
28




expanded facilities of the East Coast naval base of
Vishakhapatnam. Undoubtedly the strongest and most strategic
base the U.S.S.R. has in the Indian Ocean is on the island
of Socotra at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden. The anchorage
facilities at this former British base have been supple-
29
mented by a rebuilt airfield and an ammunition depot.
Other areas have been exposed to Soviet naval
presence as well as the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean.
Since 1969, Soviet warships have periodically cruised the
Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, and visited Cuban ports.
In May 1970 a force of Soviet ships arrived at the southern
Cuban port of Cienfuegos. This squadron of ships included a
submarine tender and three submarines and was the first step
of what appeared to be an attempt to establish a permanent
facility for nuclear submarines. American reconnaissance
photography in August seemed to confirm the type of con-
struction that would support the intelligence received pre-
viously. In September an open expression of concern by the
United States emphasized the seriousness of such an under-
taking. The obvious increase in on-station time of Y-class
ballistic missile submarines, if allowed to operate from the
Cienfuegos base, once again made Cuba the focal point of a
major power confrontation over nuclear arms. Secret diplomacy




appeared to have settled the matter by January 1971 when the
30Soviet tender departed Cienfuegos.
In West Africa, Guinea has been the scene of con-
tinuous Russian naval presence for over three years since
its President Sekou Toure asked Moscow for help in preventing
Portuguese-supported rebels from overthrowing his government.
In response to this request the Soviets dispatched a naval
combatant to patrol the coast as a show of force, a display
of naval power which continues today along with military arms
assistance. In addition to Soviet military aid, Guinea also
received assistance from Communist China in 1973 in the form
of four modern Shanghai class motor gunboats. This rivalry
has kept Toure from making any firm base commitments to
either power, but he has allowed the staging of TU-95 Bear
long-range reconnaissance bombers out of the air field in
31Conakry, the Guinean capital. This valuable addition to
surveillance of the Atlantic lessened somewhat the loss of
the air base at Mersa Matruh when Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat expelled Soviet military personnel in July 1972.
Throughout the ten years of active Soviet naval
deployment, continued efforts at neutralizing Western naval
presence have been pursued without confrontation. The
^Kenneth 0. Gilmore, "Soviet Submarines: New Challenge
from Cuba," Reader's Digest , May 1971, pp. 63-67.
Soviets Seek West African Naval Base for Patrols of






objective of equalizing the American Polaris threat with
deployed Y-class ballistic missile submarines now nears com-
pletion, with the promise of further nuclear arms competition
arising from the construction of the Soviet D-class and
American Trident submarines capable of extended range deliv-
eries. The expected reopening of the Suez Canal in the near
future provides the Soviet Navy and merchant marine some hope
of relief from the arduous and economically draining voyages
around Africa.
The world-wide Soviet naval exercise OKEAN which
Gorshkov staged in 1970 served two purposes. The first of
these objectives was to convince Soviet leadership that the
navy was indeed a viable extension of national military power
and worth every bit of the resources that were being expended.
Secondly, it was a grand scale test of the command and control
apparatus and the operational readiness of the four separate
fleets. To the West it also served notice that the Soviet
Navy was prepared to face the many faceted scenario of opera-
tional challenges perceived by its leadership. Thus, it
furnished the confirmation that the Soviet Navy had truly
emerged as a world naval power.
Throughout this study of thirty years of Soviet naval
strategy, much of the evidence given has been that of the
"best guess'* variety since accurate, detailed information
from the Soviet Union is not available. In spite of this
gap of confirmed facts, substantial grounds exist to indicate
that there are factors such as economics and foreign policy
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which in addition to military issues are significant in
determining policy. The review of current U.S. naval strategy
which follows treats these factors.
IV. REBUILDING: THE U.S. NAVY IN PEACETIME
While the analysis of Soviet naval policy decisions
implied that some political and economic elements had a
bearing on determining these outcomes, an investigation of
contemporary U.S. naval strategy exposes these same factors
more explicitly. The difference between the two studies is
that the United States presents more complete information
in plans, policy, and public pronouncements which can better
support the conclusions reached.
A. NATIONAL POLICY AND THE MILITARY
1. The Nixon Doctrine
Six months after his inauguration as President in
1969, Richard Nixon introduced a significant change in
national policy which was based on the principles of strength,
partnerships, and a willingness to negotiate. The key to
this new national direction was summed up as follows:
. . . The United States will participate in the defense
and development of allies and friends, but that America
cannot—and will not—undertake all the defense of the
free nations of the world. . o 32
U.S., Congress, Senate, Statement of Secretary of Defense
Melvin R. Laird Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on
The FY 1973 Defense Budget and FY 1973-1977 Program , February
15, 1972, p. 21.
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This important prounouncement seemed to echo the sentiments
of the American public who were rapidly becoming dissatisfied
with the extensive involvement in Vietnam. In his January
20, 1972 State of the Union message to Congress, President
Nixon further amplified the means which his strategy for
peace was to pursue:
—We will maintain a nuclear deterrent adequate to meet
any threat to the security of the United States or of
our allies.
—We will help other nations develop the capability of
defending themselves.
—We will faithfully honor all of our treaty commitments.
—We will act to defend our interests whenever and where-
ever they are threatened any place in the world.
—But where our interests or our treaty commitments are
not involved, our role will be limited.
—We will not intervene militarily.
—But we will use our influence to prevent war.
—If war comes, we will use our influence to try to
stop it.
—Once war is over, we will do our share in binding up
the wounds of those who have participated in it. 33
2. Missions of the Navy
With the Nixon Doctrine as a base, the U.S. embarked
on a more realistic concept of defense planning utilizing a
comprehensive Total Force approach which considered the inte-
gration of the capabilities not only of its own active mili-
tary forces, but also those of its allies. The Navy's role
in this Total Force atmosphere has been defined as a four-
part assignment. Because of its balancing effect in the
nuclear age, the most important of the four is Strategic
Deterrence which involves putting the ballistic missile clout
3 3 President's State of the Union Address," Commander's
Digest
,
February 3, 1972, p. 2.
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underwater, away from the homeland. Sea Control, the second,
involves keeping the shipping lanes open and getting supplies
through in war or peace in the tradition of America's well-
known sea power strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan. Thirdly,
the mission of Projection of Power requires that naval forces
be ready to attack across the cleared oceans, carrying planes,
marines, soldiers and cargo in active manner, while the
fourth function, Naval Presence, pertains to "showing the
flag," a suggestive arm of diplomacy
„
Sea Control, Projection of Power, and Naval Pres-
ence have been the missions of navies for over a century,
with the emphasis being determined by factors such as tech-
nology, numerical forces and resources, and national
interests. In the mid-1960's the development and deploy-
ment of the fleet ballistic missile submarine generated
the mission of Strategic Deterrence which became a role of
the greatest international significance. In a recent
article in the Naval War College Review , that institution's
president, Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN, discusses
the strategy of the U.S. Navy. The remainder of this
section is devoted to his analysis of the Navy's missions.
The Navy's role in Strategic Deterrence has four
principal objectives. The first is that of providing an
assured second strike capability able to inflict unacceptable
^Hice Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN, "Missions of the
U.S. Navy," Naval War College Review , March-April 1974, pp. 2-17.
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damage on any attacker, hopefully persuading the Soviet
Union from starting a nuclear war. Controlled response is
the concept which places the United States in a flexible
position in the event it is subjected to a partial nuclear
attack. Our strategic strike forces may change target
objectives under this condition. The disparity between
any third power's nuclear arsenal and that of the U.S.
should also deter them as it has the Soviet Union. Finally
this strategic force is also vital to maintaining the
balance of power , regardless of temporary appearances of
being at a disadvantage to the Soviet Union or any other
power. This factor keeps political decisions from being
adversely affected by other powers. Presently this mission
area of Strategic Deterrence does not overlap with others;
however, should enemy ASW improvements make assistance
from friendly Sea Control forces vital for survival, this
would change.
The traditional control of the sea strategy has
undergone marked modification with the advent of the modern
nuclear submarines and high performance aircraft with their
sophisticated weapons systems. The new term Sea Control
now possesses a more realistic connotation of control in
limited areas for limited periods of time. In this con-
text sea power includes the assertion of sea control by
one nation and denial of that same control to an opponent
in order to ensure industrial supplies, to reinforce and
resupply military forces engaged overseas, to provide wartime
49

economic and military support to allies, and to protect
naval forces engaged in the Projection of Power Ashore.
Means of accomplishment include tactics of blockade or
sortie control, chokepoint control, open area search and
surveillance, local area engagement, deception, and intim-
idation. These methods overlap as do the weapons systems
and vehicles that utilize them.
While Sea Control deals with what takes place on,
beneath, and above the ocean's surface, Projection of Power
Ashore deals with impact of naval forces on land forces.
This area includes the three warfare catagories of amphibious
assault, naval gunfire support, and tactical air projection.
The latter two initiatives support the amphibious assault
or opposed landings on hostile territory by direct assist-
ance to troops engaged in combat and by cutting the enemy's
supply lines in the rear. Modified by the Nixon Doctrine,
the role of Projection of Power Ashore now consists of an
active preparedness rather than the often used interven-
tionary measures of the 1950's and 1960's.
Through preventive deployments in peacetime and
reactive ones in time of crisis the mission of naval forces,
short of war, is to discourage actions contrary to the best
interests of the United States or its allies, and to encourage
those measures which are beneficial to these interests.
The tactic used to influence or threaten another nation is
called Naval Presence, and it may take the form of a poten-
tial amphibious assault, air attack, bombardment, or blockade.
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Extended reconnaissance and surveillance can also be intim-
idating factors. The different categories of national per-
ceptions make this Naval Presence mission the most complex,
sensitive, and probably least understood of all Navy tasks.
When the proper force is applied skillfully in conjunction
with diplomatic actions, it can be utilized to achieve
political objectives or deter war.
Admiral Turner cautions against misunderstanding
"the complex interdependence between naval missions and
their elements." He feels that proper awareness of their
interrelated nature is vital to optimal allocation of our
resources. The key to gaining the best understanding is
by keeping an up-to-date picture of the dynamic political
and technological factors to be utilized in updating naval
capabilities in support of national policy.
B. REBUILDING EFFORTS
1. Post Vietnam Assessment
With the exception of the world-wide alert ini-
tiated by President Nixon during the Yom Kippur War in
October 1973, the U.S. Navy has passed its first year in
a peacetime atmosphere since 1965. Prior to that date,
which marked the origin of American involvement in Vietnam,
the United States had served as the champion of the West in
support of its treaty commitments all over the world. Inter-
ventions and displays of force were a regular occurrence




in Southeast Asia drew all of the Navy's forces into an
active part. In addition to the traditional roles of gun-
fire support, amphibious assault, and strike aircraft
operations, coastal patrol and riverine warfare missions
placed new demands for developing equipment and tactics on
the naval advisers. This commitment giving Vietnam the
highest priority drained resources from the other fleets
and upset operating and maintenance schedules.
The results of this all-out effort by the Navy
can be evaluated with some precision now that the sole
assistance to Vietnam is in the form of economic and mili-
tary aid. The most serious problem that the Navy faced in
1973 was that of block obsolescence. Responding to the
needs of World War II, the U.S. shipbuilding industry had
expanded to produce 1,136 vessels from battleships to sub-
marines. During the Korean War no extensive building
programs were undertaken because of the large number of
ships' in service. With the exception of about 70 modern
guided missile ships and destroyers authorized in the 1950' s,
no replacements for the World War II vintage vessels were
initiated due to the expensive, high priority Polaris
system development. In July 1970 the Navy had over 300
out of 760 World War II ships in active service which were
going to have to be retired within the next decade. As
early as 1969 the House Armed Services Seapower Subcommittee
in a report, The Status of Naval Ships , revealed how acute
the problem of obsolescence really was. The investigation
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disclosed that 58$ of U.S. naval combatants were twenty-
years old or older, while less than one percent of the
Soviet Navy ships were that old. With the average age of
U.S. Navy ships being 17s years, the study concluded that
it was imperative for the Navy to commence an immediate
well-balanced new construction program. From 1969 to
the present this dilemma has been brought more sharply into
focus because of the rapid rise of the Soviet Navy. Since
the expansion of the modern Soviet fleet units into the
oceans of the world, competition for naval superiority has
made fleet modernization imperative. The already difficult
rebuilding task is further complicated by mounting national
feeling to cut the defense spending which had dominated the
budget for so long, and concentrate on other national
priorities such as unemployment, education, and the
environment.
2. New Construction Programs
The question is, how does a navy go about re-
building in the face of an emerging threat to its naval
superiority, especially when confronted with obsolescence
and manpower difficulties? At the turn of the century the
German Navy was emerging to compete with the Royal Navy
which had been virtually unchallenged on the high seas
for over a century. The British perceived this aggressive
35Arnold M. Kuzmack, Naval Force Levels and Moderniza-
tion
,





competition as a threat to the safety of their colonial
empire. As Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet
and later as First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher
recognized the need for reform to improve the readiness
and effectiveness of the Royal Navy. His primary concern
was a four point plan to reorganize and modernize the
fleet. In spite of protests inside the Navy and outside
of it, he scrapped over 154 active and 60 reserve vessels
which he considered obsolete. He redistributed fleets
and squadrons to provide an interlocking system of rein-
forcement in any threatened area, and he also revamped the
reserve fleet, initiating a nucleus crew concept which
improved readiness considerably. A new ship design inno-
vation, the Dreadnought class battleship, guaranteed
British naval superiority and set the pace for increased
capital ship construction by the world's navies. In addi-
tion to these materiel advances, conditions of service
were improved for personnel in the wardroom and lower
decks.
a. Shipbuilding
Since his appointment as Chief of Naval
Operations in 1970, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt has under-
taken programs to rebuild the U.S. Navy which have a
First Sea Lord is the Royal Navy equivalent to
the Chief of Naval Operations in the United States Navy.
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similar pattern to that which Admiral Fisher embarked on
some seventy years earlier. In 1967 Navy planners had pro-
jected that the 1975 fleet would number 826 ships which
would include 20 aircraft carriers, 137 amphibious assault
ships, 243 escort ships, and 105 attack submarines (including
69 nuclear boats). By 1970 rising Vietnam military costs
had necessitated a revision of this estimate to include a
1975 total of 578 ships, composed of only 15 carriers, 67
amphibious ships, 205 escorts, and 87 attack submarines.
This loss of 24$ ships or 30$ of the originally projected
fleet strength in only three years reflected the difficult
planning decisions that had to be made. Admiral Zumwalt
addressed this situation in Fiscal Year 1973 Navy budget
hearings before the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees:
The hard choices involve trade-offs between the present
and the future—that is, between spending heavily to
provide a greater capability today by keeping more
older ships in service, or using more funds to procure
new ships and aircraft, thereby increasing future
capability. . . We are putting an increased proportion
of our resources into future capabilities. We are
doing more R&D and are buying more new ships and com-
bat aircraft, but with the result that there will be
fewer ships and aircraft in the fleet in the next
few years. 3$
The resultant strategy that has evolved from
this decision has been called the "hi—lo" mix principle. It
defines a shipbuilding program which combines highly sophis-
ticated ships such as the nuclear frigates and SSN-688 class
38James D. Hessman, "New Ship Programs: Trade-Off Between







submarines, with the less sophisticated, less expensive
systems such as the Patrol Frigates, Sea Control Ships, and
Guided Missile Hydrofoils. The Navy will buy 33 of these
"high mix" vessels from fiscal years 1970-1975. The average
cost of this procurement package which includes mostly DD-963
class destroyers and nuclear frigates is $104 million per
unit. The multi-purpose Spruance class destroyer is an
attempt to fill the void created by the decommissioning of
numerous World War II vessels, while the nuclear frigates
are programmed to escort the CVN's currently under construc-
tion. The "lo-mix" group which is to produce 80 ships at
$43 million a unit, continues the effort to bridge the
obsolescence gap. The PHM patrol hydrofoil is a cooperative
NATO development between the U.S., Italy, and West Germany;
the Navy plans to build 30 of these swift gunboats which will
be armed with the Harpoon surface-to-surface missile, and use
them for coastal patrol to free the larger escorts for open
ocean service. The 50 ship Patrol Frigate program will pro-
vide austere, missile-armed, gas-turbine vessels in large
numbers to augment the modern escort force vital in this era
39
of widely deployed Soviet nuclear submarines. The low-
cost Sea Control Ship is another effort advocated by Admiral
Zumwalt to meet the critical Sea Control mission of the Navy.
The concept of this 14,000 ton, gas turbine-propelled carrier
was the subject of recent tests conducted by the USS Guam
39
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56

(LPH-9), where a mix of aircraft including the AV-8A
Harrier and SH-3H ASW helicopter was evaluated. In addition
to the ASW mission, the airborne intercept task was attempted
by the Harriers with some success. Although the AV-#A
Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing (V/STOL) airframe and the
LPH platform were not exact prototypes for the planned pro-
gram, the basic elements of aircraft performance and the
Guam's similar size and lack of catapults and arresting
gear provided sufficient justification for the Navy to
request appropriations for the first Sea Control Ship in the
Fiscal Year 1975 budget. 40
This "hi—lo" mix initiative has been subjected
to a great deal of criticism from Admiral Hyman Rickover and
other nuclear power advocates. They feel that nuclear pro-
pulsion in ocean-going warships is the only means for sur-
viving in the threat environment presented by the modern,
high-speed nuclear submarine fleet of the Soviet Union,
especially in view of the potentially crippling effects of
the energy crisis on national defense recently revealed
during the Arab oil embargo. Zumwalt's supporters argue
that the relative effectiveness gained by the speed and fuel
savings of nuclear-powered carriers and escorts is not as
significant as their high construction costs and the imme-
diate need to provide greater numbers of ships in the fleet
Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Sea Control Ship Tests






as replacements for those being phased out due to old age.
A possible solution to this conflict of needs and current
cost-limitations may be found upon completion of the research
and development of the Surface Effect Ship (SES) prototype.
Aerojet-General Corporation and Bell Aerospace Company are
currently testing 100 ton designs of this warship of the
future with the goal of developing a 2,000 ton SES vessel to
assume present destroyer ASW roles in the 1980's. These
air cushion test vehicles have already achieved speeds in
the 70-80 nautical miles per hour range, and with their
reduced size and cost will present quite a formidable foe
to the nuclear submarine if their trials continue to be
„ , 41
successful.
While general purpose force replacement is vital
to the Navy's Mahanian concept of sea power, over one-third
of the shipbuilding budget requests ($3.7 billion average
in FY 74 and 75) in the last two years has been designated
for the completion of Poseidon missile conversions on fleet
ballistic missile submarines and for the construction of the
new Trident missile submarines. This addition to U.S.
strategic delivery forces is considered essential for two
reasons. The first of these is the hedge against the aging
of the first ten Polaris submarines which are now over ten
years old. The second ground for this development was the
"Navy Planning Ships That Skim Ocean Surface," Los
Angeles Times




need to provide a longer range ballistic missile to compli-
cate the ASW problem for enemy naval forces. The fear is
that the present limited missile range would allow the
Soviets to concentrate their ASW efforts in a smaller area,
from the maximum range of these missiles towards the coast-
line, and increase their probability of detection of this
threat. The Trident missile with its range of over 4,000
nautical miles and its multiple independently targetable
re-entry vehicle warhe'ads (MIRV) is designed to strengthen
the deterrent power by greatly expanding the area of possible
launch positions.
Congress opposed the rapid development of this
development of this expensive weapons system since most of
its members felt that the Poseidon missile conversions with
its extended range (3,000 nautical miles) missiles with MIRV
warheads were sufficient until the Trident could be developed
at a normal pace. However, in late 1973 naval intelligence
revealed that not only had the Soviets built D-class sub-
marines with their version of the extended range missile
(three are operational) , but they were also testing MIRV
warheads for use on their ballistic missiles. These occur-
rences influenced the legislators to accelerate the program
which is expected to produce the first Trident submarine
in 1978.
b. Aircraft and Missile Development
The need to find a successor for the aging F-4




and the Air Force throughout the Vietnam conflict placed the
Navy in the center of another controversy. The Navy has
been convinced that the Grumman F-14A Tomcat and its expensive
Phoenix missile system are the ideal combination to fill the
dual role of protecting the fleet from Soviet long-range
supersonic bombers and cruise missiles and of intercepting
the high-flying supersonic Soviet MIG-25 Foxbat fighter.
The debate centers around the F-14A's $25.3 million price
tag which is considerably higher than the $13 million cost
per unit of the F-4J versions requested in the FY 74 budget.
In mid-1973 McDonnell Douglas Corporation tried to sell
Navy Secretary John Warner the F-15N, the carrier version of
the F-15 which the Air Force had ordered. Although this
aircraft was very adequate in the fighter role, the Navy
argued that the F-14A with its Phoenix missile ($292,000
per unit) was vital to fleet defense. After a lengthy debate
with top Defense Department officials such as Deputy Secretary
William Clements, the Navy has apparently prevailed in its
efforts to procure this versatile weapons system.
Even after the Russian-made Styx anti-ship
missiles sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat in 1967, the U.S.
Navy's efforts were directed at defense against this new
capability rather than developing a surface-to-surface missile
of its own. In 1971, however, efforts were directed at
i 2
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developing the cruise missile as an offensive weapon. The
interim measure was the Standard SSM which was originally-
fitted out on two Asheville class patrol gunboats and is
also compatible for launch from Anti-Submarine Rocket (ASROC)
launchers found on destroyer-type vessels. In the last two
years accelerated development of the Harpoon missile by
McDonnell Douglas Corporation has provided the U.S. Navy
with a reliable offensive SSM which should begin production
in 1975. This medium-range weapon has been successfully
tested in firings from surface ship and airborne platforms,
and research is being conducted on an encapsulated version
capable of launch from a submarine's torpedo tubes. Be-
sides being the main battery for the NATO patrol hydrofoil
(PHM) , Harpoon was designed for use on existing surface
ships utilizing ASROC, Terrier, and Tartar launchers already
installed. Approval for pilot production of this missile
will depend on the June 1974 decision of the Defense Systems
Acquisition Review Council's (DSARC) evaluation of six more
fully guided air and surface test firings. Besides the
recent sweeping successes of Israel's Gabriel missile against
Russian made missile gunboats of the Syrian Navy in the Yom
Kippur War, the development of cruise missiles by other
Western nations, such as France's Exocet and the American
Harpoon, serves greatly to close the Soviet margin of superiority,
Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Navy Plans Fully Guided






The need to replace aging hardware was only one of the
current problems faced by naval planners. The end of the
draft and the oil shortage are among the other factors
which have required consideration in the changes to peace-
time operations.
1. Adjusting to Deployed Requirements
In order to meet the commitments necessary to ful-
fill the Navy's missions after its recent Southeast Asian
involvement, adjustments were imperative. With the Navy
having been cut by 45$ since the peak of the Vietnam war,
and with fleet strength at its lowest level since 1937,
U.S. naval planners had to consider alternatives to tradi-
tional deployment patterns. Besides the reduced numbers
available for world-wide assignments, decreased operating
and maintenance funds further complicated the problem.
Expanded Soviet naval presence in all oceans of the world
required the Navy to maintain its deployed naval forceso
The practical solution chosen by Admiral Zumwalt was the
semi-permanent deployment of ships at overseas bases and
the establishment of new bases close to the areas of intended
operations.
In the Mediterranean where the Soviets first ini-
tiated their policy of formal deployment, Soviet naval
ship-operating days had soared from 4,000 in 1965 to an
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average of over 18,000 per year in the early 1970*s. In
early 1972 the United States and Greece reached an agree-
ment on the use of Piraeus as a homeport for a carrier task
force of the Sixth Fleet. This measure allows a carrier and
destroyer squadron to remain on station for a two year
period before rotating back to the United States. Dependents
of the ships* personnel are located in the homeport area in
an effort to alleviate the family separation problem. Al-
though Congress opposed the move because of the potential
adverse effect on the balance of trade, and NATO members
were against any initiative that could be construed as aid
to the ruling Greek military junta, in late 1973 the House
Armed Services Subcommittee in Military Installations and
Facilities approved the funds for a five year lease of prop-
erty needed to establish the support facilities ashore in
Greece. The timing of the vote on this measure with the
developments of the Yom Kippur War may have had a favorable
influence on its passage.
Another Mediterranean base was established in 1972
when the U.S» and Italy agreed on the construction of a
base for nuclear-powered submarines at La Maddalena, an
island north of Sardinia. The submarine tender Howard W.
^Barry M. Blechman, The Changing Soviet Navy
,
(Washington:
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Gilmore, was directed to its new homeport where it acts as
the support vessel for these submarines. This gave the U.S.
another nuclear submarine support facility to add to her
other European bases of Holy Loch, Scotland, and Rota, Spain.
The reasons for the establishment of the new base were
similar to those of the Greek homeport: reduction of materiel
wear previously caused by transits and the alleviation of
family separation.
In the Pacific the realignment continued with the
planned homeporting of a carrier and a destroyer squadron in
Yokosuka, and support ships in Sasebo. Over the past three
years the relocation of these ships to Japan has taken place,
culminating with the USS Midway *s arrival in October 1973.
In March 1974, the Navy announced the transfer of six destroyers
currently homeported in Pearl Harbor and San Diego to the
naval base at Guam. This reassignment of ships and dependents
will be completed by 1976, and will further strengthen the
in
naval posture in the Western Pacific.
Recently the Indian Ocean and the small British-
owned island of Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago have
become headline news. When the Soviets first began operating
their fleet in the Indian Ocean in 1968, their 1,800 ship-
operating days were spent in diplomatic and goodwill visits.
Pc Alikov, "Another American Base on Italian Soil,"
Morskoi Sbornik
, No. 3, October 1973, pp. 97-98.
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By 1972 their operations in the littoral nations in the area
had grown to 3,800 ship-operating days; additionally, the
number of port facility usage agreements had increased.
The British had left the area by 1971, but they had allowed
the U.S. to maintain 200 personnel and a communications station
on Diego Garcia. The oil embargo made the Western world,
who depended on its oil from the Middle East, aware of the
strategic lines of communication from petroleum sources in
the Perisan Gulf to Western ports. The United States received
permission from Great Britain to expand the facilities of
Diego Garciao The Navy has requested $29 million in appro-
priations to increase fuel storage capacity, deepen the
lagoon to make the anchorage capable of accommodating an
aircraft carrier and its escorts, and to lengthen the
existing runway at the airfield. Because of the distances
U.S. Navy ships have to travel to deploy in the Indian Ocean,
it is essential to have at least a very basic logistics
49
support facility. Speculation about the future of naval
activity in the Indian Ocean has increased recently, but
the outcome is still in doubt.
2. Current Problems
a. All Volunteer Navy
A certain general dissatisfaction with the nature
of the lengthy Vietnam War brought an end to the draft in
id
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,
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^Admiral Elmo R. Zurnwalt , Jr., USN, "Strategic Importance
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July 1973. Converting to the All-Volunteer concept at a
time when a military career was not a popular choice posed
a manpower challenge that was to equal the materiel predica-
ment. In spite of the reduction in naval manpower levels
from a high of 765,000* in 1968 to 551,000 in June 1974, the
Navy has had to concentrate a considerable amount of its
resources in an effort to make the All-Volunteer concept
successful. The groundwork for this program to retain and
recruit the needed manpower in peacetime was begun when
Admiral Zumwalt became CN0 in 1970. Many of his personal
directives, called Z-grams, were intended to ease the stereo-
typed rigors of service life and increase retention rates.
Conservative elements in the Navy were dissatisfied with
these liberal changes, and when racial and disciplinary
incidents took place in October and November of 1972 on the
carriers Kitty Hawk and Constellation , the House Armed Serv-
ices Committee conducted an investigation. The subcommittee,
headed by Representative Floyd Hicks, reported that "an
environment of leniency, appeasement and permissiveness" had
been created, and it made sixteen recommendations designed to
promote good order and discipline. Admiral Zumwalt disagreed
with these findings of the Navy's "problems" and limited his
reaction to verbal and written reminders of the leadership
responsibilities of all in the chain of command and to a
directive to give voluntary general discharges "under honor-




and non-producers. He also added new emphasis to drug
abuse, race relations, and management improvement programs
which were later to be incorporated into the present Human
Goals Program.
As the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War drew
to a close, the stabilization of personnel policies became
a priority item. In addition to better advance planning of
individual tour assignments, attempts were made to prevent
promotion slowdowns which had resulted from imbalances in
grade and rank structure. In spite of attempts by some
legislators to reduce retirement, flight pay, commissary,
and exchange, and medical benefits, the Navy and the other
armed forces have received several basic pay raises in the
last few years which have made them more competitive with
civilian opportunities in the All-Volunteer environment.
Navy manpower costs consume about 43$ of "the service's budget;
but, with the first year without the draft drawing to a close
and over 95$ of the recruiting goal having been met, it seems
that the pay increases will supplement other recruiting in-
centives and make the costly concept a success.
b. The Energy Crisis
The recent revelation of the far reaching effects
of the energy crisis affected the Navy in several ways. The
Navy had cut back fuel usage in 1973 by seven percent before
L. Edgar Prina, "Hicks Panel Hits 'Permissiveness,'
Lack of Discipline," Sea Power , March 1973, pp. 35-3$.
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the Arab oil embargo created shortages. The need to reduce
operating costs prompted the earlier efforts to conserve
fuel, but the embargo situation curtailed fleet steaming days
by about 20$ and military flying hours by 18$. If this
shortage were not enough of a problem, the Saudi Arabian
government threatened to cut off oil supplies to all countries
who supplied oil products to U.S. military forces overseas.
Since the Pacific Fleet has been purchasing up to 95$ of its
oil supplies from foreign companies, all movements were
greatly reduced and large numbers of ships forced to remain
in port until substantial fuel supplies were delivered from
the U.S. Even though the embargo is presently not in effect,
the implications of the incident's importance for future
51defense planning are far from subtle.
At home military oil supplies have also been in
danger in recent months. Not only were there cries for con-
tinued reduction of defense petroleum use, but there were
extreme pressures applied for the government to release
Naval Petroleum Reserves, (NPR)l(Elk Hills, Ca.) and
(NPR)A-(Alaska) , for commercial production to relieve the
national shortages. When this effort was delayed in legal
and national defense debates, oil companies with drilling
rights adjacent to these reserves began drilling in their
boundary areas. When claims were made to the effect that
c-iJ
"Oil Cutoff Means Less Flight, Steaming Time," Navy
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,
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these wells were started in an effort to tap the NPR re-
sources, court injunctions suspended all drilling until the
dispute could be settled.
c. Economy Measures
(l) Consolidation/Reduction
On April 17, 1973 Defense Secretary Elliot
Richardson announced the details of the consolidation, reduc-
tion, realignment, or closure of 274 military installations
in the United States and Puerto Rico. With the Navy reduc-
tion in fleet size from 917 ships in June 1964 to 523 in
June 1974, and naval aircraft being similarly reduced from
5,014 to 3,956, facilities cutbacks were inevitable. After
some previous study, the Navy determined that one criteria
in this phasing out of certain commands was the requirement
for at least two homeports on each coast capable of servicing
modern carriers. The Newport/Quonset Point Naval Stations
were only able to support the smaller ASW carriers, and the
Long Beach Naval Station was also considered inappropriate for
the large modern dual role (CV) carriers. These installa-
tions plus the Key West, Florida Naval Station and the Boston
and Hunter's Point Naval Shipyards were closed, while over
twenty other naval facilities underwent reduction or
realignment
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As a further extension of this base con-
solidation and reduction plan, fleet staffs were scrutinized
to determine where structure and billet modifications were
necessary. A 25$ reduction of command/headquarters activities
was recommended during FY 73 Budget Hearings before the
Senate Armed Services Committee, A CNO study group was
formed in July 1972 to examine the existing framework of
fleet staffs and to recommend reorganizations including
vertical eliminations and consolidations necessary to conform
to the requested reductions. Missions and functions of all
types of fleet staffs were studied with duplication and
excessive layering being the targets. On November 14, 1972
the final recommendations were submitted to the CNO Executive
Board where decisions were made. The streamlining involved
disestablishing approximately 55 staffs of the Commanders
of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and the U.S. Naval Forces
in Europe. Of the original base of 15,816 billets, 3,976




In 1971 the Navy was faced with the diffi-
cult task of convincing Congress to replace 14 fleet oil
tankers at $100 million a unit. Since other shipbuilding
replacement programs had priority, naval leaders decided
530ffice of the Chief of Naval Operations (0P-100D),
"Fy 74 Fleet Staff Reduction and Reorganization," Paper used




to charter nine privately built tankers for the Military
Sealift Command (MSC). MSC's 103 ship fleet, which includes
56 dry cargo vessels, 17 tankers, and 30 special project
ships, has recently begun testing of a new coordinated
logistics concept. In addition to experimental refuelings
with U.S. and NATO warships, two types of barge carriers, the
Lash and Seabee , are being developed to replenish the Navy
at sea. Critics have argued that it will be more expensive
to pay the yearly charter fee over the 20 year period than
to pay the lump sum construction costs. However, the
urgent requirements to replace aging surface combatants and
to construct a nuclear submarine force left no other alter-
native than to lease these needed tankers from commercial
firms for MSC. 5Zf
Although it may not be considered an econom-
ical measure to some, the repair of partially inoperative
aircraft and ships overdue for overhaul is a better alternative
than buying replacement units. A recent Pentagon report
revealed that 5,300 out of 14,900 (35$) Air Force, Army,
Navy, and Marine tactical aircraft are not fully operational
because of shortages in repair parts or overdue maintenance.
Moreover, about 40 Navy ships are late in undergoing their
regularly scheduled overhaul and this number is rising.
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements recently
"^"MSC Role Growing as Fleet Supplier," Navy Times ,
2 May 1973, p. 26.
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explained to Congress that much of the maintenance has been
delayed repeatedly "because of the tempo of military opera-
tions, first in Vietnam and then in connection with the
Middle East." The Pentagon budget request for this year in-
cludes $63.6 million to accomplish the needed aircraft main-
tenance and to build up supplies of spare parts. Additional
funds are requested to permit the expansion of ship overhaul
programs in order to take advantage of idle space available
55in shipyards.
Along with these major programs others have
been initiated at lower command levels. The increased inport
time for ships and reduced flying time for squadrons has been
channeled into attempts to increase materiel readinesso
Type commands have created additional technical assistance
teams to assist squadron and shipboard maintenance personnel
and to train them in proper procedures. Combat readiness
and flying expertise are also receiving consideration through
the increased use of various types of simulators. The avia-
tion community is developing flight simulation centers with
realistic features in an effort to keep flight crews pro-
ficient. Other weapons systems training aids are being prod-
uced to provide facilities for tactical practice now that
actual operational time is severely limited.
^ 5
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V. THE EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS ON NAVAL STRATEGY
In the United States it is the opinion of many congress-
men that the policy-making function of the military is to
analyze military problems and to devise a proposed means of
accomplishing the task of national defense, allowing others
to determine if political considerations override that assess-
ment. Some military leaders have also stated that their
military advice should not include any consideration of
political or economic issues. Thus, military analysis has
primarily focused on the objectivity of force levels, capa-
bilities, and tactics with little or no emphasis on the
intentions of the potential enemy or on the extenuating pos-
sibilities of political and economic factors. The analyses
of the recent naval strategies of the U.S. and Soviet Navies
have indicated that these external and internal factors can
greatly influence the strategy and the means used to execute
it.
A. ACTION/REACTION
In an October 1973 Foreign Affairs article, "Toward A
Western Philosophy of Coexistence," Marshall D. Shulman relates
the U.S. -Soviet relationship after the 1972 Moscow Summit on
seven planes: strategic-military competition, conventional
military competition, political competition, economic competi-
tion and cooperation, ideological conflict, cultural relations,
and functional cooperation. The long years of the "cold war"
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and aggressive nature of the Communist ideology have under-
standably influenced U.S. naval planners to analyze the
rapid expansion of the Soviet Navy in a cautious, "cover-all-
bets" manner. This form of contingency analysis and plan-
ning is vital to the overall body of defense policy; however,
accurate investigations of current pronouncements and tactics
when compared with those of the past can provide valuable
insight regarding the intentions of the Soviets. One factor
that requires sorting out is the determination of whether an
initiative or capability is in the form of an action or a
reaction.
Some of the Soviet decisions which can be considered
reactionary in nature were the development of the cruise
missile to counter the strategic delivery threat of the
carrier, the reactive deployments of the Mediterranean Squad-
ron to neutralize Sixth Fleet concentrations during Middle
East crises, and the Surface-to-Air missile and ASW surface
ship conversions to enhance survival in the forward deploy-
ment atmosphere. In early 1969 the Soviet Navy demonstrated
a classic example of an action in the form of gunboat diplo-
macy in order to gain the release of two Soviet fishing
trawlers that had been impounded the previous October by
Ghana When strong protests and economic sanctions failed,
the Soviet Union acted by dispatching three warships to the





released. Another action which has been attributed as a
reaction by some was the deployment of Soviet naval units to
the Indian Ocean from 1968 to the present. When the British
decided to withdraw from the areas east of Suez in 196S, the
Soviets began a gradual increase of naval presence. Today
the presence is construed as a threat to the Middle East oil
supply lines to the West. However, the utilization of naval
diplomacy to cultivate ties with India culminated in the
signing of a 20 year treaty of friendship and cooperation in
August 1971. This demonstration of support prior to the out-
break of the Indo-Pakistan War, provided the Soviets with
an ally on China's southern border at a time when tensions
were heightened by the Sino-Soviet split.
The U.S. Navy has also reacted to the presence and tech-
nological developments of the Soviet Union. As a result of
the recent oil embargo and the increasing number of Soviet
naval facility agreements on the East African coast and in
the Persian Gulf, the U.S. Navy has used the need to protect
the vital oil supply routes from the Middle East as justifi-
cation for periodic deployment of carrier forces to the
Indian Ocean, and the expansion of the ship and aircraft
support capabilities on Diego Garcia. In response to the
ever-growing threat of the vast Soviet nuclear submarine
fleet, the U.So has become greatly committed to anti-submarine
warfare. From the development of special underwater
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surveillance systems such as SOSUS/Caesar (Sonar Surveillance
System) and SASS (Suspended Array Subsystem) to new tactics
created around such fleet units as the nuclear attack sub-
marine, the dual purpose CV, and the Sea Control and Surface
Effect ships of the future, the Navy's reaction to this threat
has been a full-scale effort. Even though many U.S. naval
experts feel that the Soviet Navy and merchant marine will be
the biggest benefactors of the reopening of the Suez Canal,
the action of providing U.S. naval demolition experts and
equipment to help remove the mines and bombs from the canal,
could further serve to weaken the Soviet influence in Egypt
and strengthen U.S. diplomatic ties with the Arab states.
These examples demonstrate the usefulness of action/reaction
considerations in planning and evaluating naval strategy.
B. POLITICAL-ECONOMIC FACTORS
1. Ideology
Since World War II the United States and the Soviet
Union have attempted to impose their "totalitarian" and
"imperialistic" ideologies on the international system. By
utilizing the tactics of intervention or wars of liberation,
the self-proclaimed champions of democracy and communism
have failed to successfully contain each other. The American
trauma of the Vietnam war and the Soviets' preoccupation with
their own interests rather than those of international commu-
nism, have prompted the United States to establish the Nixon
Doctrine and the Soviets to pronounce the shift to an evolu-
tionary doctrine from a revolutionary one. In the light of
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recent events, the various agreements in the spirit of detente
which were signed at the Moscow summit of 1972 seem to be in
jeopardy. The disastrous grain purchase, the confrontation
during the Yom Kippur War, and the recent stalemate in the
talks for further strategic arms limitation in SALT-2 have
revealed the split between the civilian and military leaders
that occurred as a result of detente.
While civilian leadership of both governments has
been influenced to pursue detente because of the detrimental
effects of the escalation of an arms race on the national
economy, the military has publicly expressed the dangers of
such a policy. In the Soviet Union the Talenskiy-Arbatov
school of thought has proposed that military force has lost
its political utility in the modern world. Numerous military
articles, however, have countered that the best way to achieve
57peace and maintain it is through a position of strength.
Undaunted by the appeasing nature of detente diplomacy, the
hawkish Soviet military has proceeded to optimize its lead in
throw-weight by testing new or improved ICBM's and attempting
to make a breakthrough in the area where the U.S. had an advan-
tage, that of MIRV technology.
Their American military counterparts were also not
trusting in the future of the negotiated summit agreements.
A recent editorial in the Navy League publication, Seapower ,
* Matt Gallagher, "The Military Role in Soviet Decision-
Making," in Soviet Naval Developments
,
(Halifax: Centre for
Foreign Studies, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie
University, 1973), p» 4o
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provided a skeptical assessment of the "sufficiency" tenet of
the Nixon Doctrine:
Question: What happens next, when military parity
gives way to military sufficiency? The definition
of sufficiency, which is one notch below parity,
is that you're strong enough to deter an enemy
from attacking you directly. But maybe not strong
enough to deter him from doing anything else he
wants, anywhere else he wants. 58
The added impetus of recent intelligence concerning the Soviets'
strategic missile testing efforts and their construction of
three D-class submarines (equivalent to the U.S. Trident
class) , aided the Navy in obtaining appropriations to accel-
erate the Trident program which was still in the design
phase. At this point it seems that these developments and
the failure of the SALT-2 talks have clouded the future of
detente and have set the stage for a continuation of the
arms race.
2. Decision-Making
The Soviet Navy has only recently received recogni-
tion as an integral part of that nation's defense picture.
The Army's marshalls have always dominated the Ministry of
Defense of this traditional land power, with the result being
that the Navy's major program gains have only occurred when
the UoS. has posed a serious naval threat (i.e e the CVA and
Polaris). Further complicating the efforts of the Navy to
develop a coherent strategy is the fact that many of the
Soviet Union's political leaders are World War II army
eg
"The Desert and the Sea," Seapower , November 1973, p. 4<
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veterans. Due to the nature of the governing body in the
Soviet Union, all national decisions are considered and made
by a small group of men and are not subject to public debate
as in the U.S.
An in-depth look at the forward deployment policy
reveals information which implies that the decision was made
by the political leaders with little or no consultation with
Admiral Gorshkov and naval planners. Michael MccGwire
addressed this possibility in "Developments in Soviet Naval
Policy: 1955-1973" when he inferred that the army-dominated
leadership did not realize the resource demands and prepara-
tion that such a commitment required. The Soviet Navy which
had traditionally been trained and prepared for a coastal
defense of the Motherland, was expected to operate in a
peacetime status under the same continuous conditions that
were usually experienced only in time of war. Additionally,
this mission was to be undertaken in ocean areas far from
their homeports and dominated by their Western opponents.
When the decision was made in 196l the Soviet fleet was not
prepared materiel-wise or tactically; even though Admiral
Gorshkov has claimed credit for the ultimate success of the
Soviet Navy's emergence, a review of the first years of the
concept indicates that it was a poorly planned operation.
From the standpoint of force level considerations
a two or three year gap existed from the time the decision
was made until the design effort for the first multi-purpose,
new construction vessel was completed. Since the Krivak
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class destroyer was not due for delivery until 1970, SAM
and ASW conversions of selected destroyers were begun in the
mid-1960' s to protect against the vulnerability of open
ocean operations outside the range of land-based air cover.
This air cover was also essential to the utilization of the
long-range cruise missile system. Without the aircraft for
external target data, the innovative SSM was limited to the
horizon range of the vessel's radar. The lack of afloat
support had proved to be a critical shortcoming throughout
the early pilot deployments until 1965. In spite of efforts
in 1966 to obtain bases in Egypt, it was not until July of
1967 that Soviet naval ships gained facilities there on a
permanent basiso In the following three years numerous agree-
ments for usage of facilities were reached with countries
on the North and East African coasts. But agreements can be
broken and the Soviets made no effort to construct support
vessels other than submarine tenders. In a wartime situation
this logistic weakness could combine with the geographic
vulnerability of the four isolated fleets to seriously hamper
combat effectiveness. Even when the forward deployment con-
cept was expanded to all the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian
Oceans no evidence of an increase in support vessel con-
struction was observed. If the concept was well planned
according to military tradition, open ocean combat training
would prepare fleet units to meet their potential threats<>
However, it was not until February 1963 that Admiral Gorshkov
wrote an article expressing the need to develop sea keeping
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and all weather combat capabilities. This collection of
evidence demonstrates the delays between the decision and
significant actions to implement it. It seems that this
analysis would lend credence to the hypothesis that the
naval "strategy" was conceived by Party leaders, and was
not a result of military planning. In the U.S. this manner
of naval planning usually takes place only in the event of
a crisis and rarely for extended periods of time.
3. Defense Budget
In the United States the budget requests of the
military services are subjected to intensive review by
both Houses of Congress. The varying interests of the
diverse constituents represented by these legislators is
molded into an approved yearly spending program integrated
into the joint service long-range scheme, the Five Year
Defense Plan. In the last three fiscal years the U.S.
Navy has received several billion dollars more in yearly
•appropriations than each of the other services. In spite
of the increase in funds, inflation, the rising cost of
manpower, and a condition of block obsolescence among the
vessels of the surface combat fleet have greatly reduced
the flexibility of procurement and operation.
The Soviet Navy has also suffered program disruption
due to economic priorities. Western analysts have been
quick to laud the Soviet concept of smaller ships with
greater firepower. However, Soviet surface combatant
building capacity has" been reduced due to the higher
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priority of civilian and submarine construction programs.
When the Sverdlov class cruiser was cancelled by the 1954
decision, the building ways were reallocated to merchant
marine construction. In recent years two cruiser ways were
assigned for the building of the Kiev and the Minsk
, the
Russian's first carriers. Even this effort has been sub-
ject to the skeptical review of the political leadership.
A Soviet naval attache recently revealed that the Navy had
asked for eight of the V/STOL carriers but was only
59
allowed two/ 7 The result of this low priority for surface
ships was that the Kara, Kresta, and Kynda class cruisers
were constructed in destroyer size building ways. The
Krivak class destroyer is in series production in the escort
yard at Kalingrad, while the 200 foot, 650 ton Nanuchka
class rocket patrol boat is being built in the torpedo
boat yard that produced the 123 foot, 200 ton Osa class
missile boat. The range, payload, and accuracy of the
cruise missile systems installed on these vessels easily off-
set this size constraint. Limiting factors such as this
showed the effects of other priorities on the defense budget.
Submarines were generally considered a more cost effective
weapon until the expensive ballistic missile submarines
went into production. Even though detailed information
59
"Russian Navy has Trouble Getting Ships," Los Angeles
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, 1 April 1973, p. 10.
MccGwire, "Soviet Naval Programmes," pp. 222-223.
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concerning Soviet defense spending is not available,
inferences can be made by investigating the chronology of
the various programs.
4. Research and Development
Earlier discussions of naval shipbuilding methods
and programs served to explain the pattern of Soviet naval
developments in recent years. A continuation of this type
of study in the field of research and development reveals
further differences between the U.S. and the Soviet Union
in the applications of new innovations. In his "Turning
Point in Naval Policy Formation," Michael MccGwire reports
the tendency of the Soviets to install and operate major
new capabilities in the very early stages of their develop-
ment. Evidence of this is given in the evolution of their
surface-to-surface cruise missile (SSM) program. The
earliest version of the SSN-1 cruise missile was placed on
four units of the Kotlin class destroyer (now the Kildin
class) in a brief three years from design-decision to
delivery. Subsequently variants of this system were intro-
duced progressively at different stages of development.
This scheme of technical innovation contrasts the
U.S. military practice of extensive research and development
and operational test and evaluation before procurement
approval is given to produce the operational version. The
improvement and modification of the more advanced variants
of the system is not unique to the U.S. process, but the
more methodical American process is aimed at producing a
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reliable system, not just a capability. The urgent need to
exploit the advantages of these new systems in their rise
from an inferior maritime position was probably the primary
reason for this method of systems development. The Soviets
have always been technical innovators, and have never been
cautious about the application of these new capabilities.
Besides the advantages to be gained from operational evalua-
tion of several prototypes, the Russians are aware of the
tendency of the West to appraise each new capability on a
worst case basis. As a result of over two decades of nuclear
confrontation, the U.S. tendency to view the Soviets in this
manner is well known to Soviet leaders and has enhanced
their ability to bluff successfully,, A major factor in this
appriasal problem is obvious when comparing the relatively
incomplete intelligence information the U.S. has compiled
on Russian advanced systems with the detailed scientific
reports on the newest American weapons that appear in tech-
nical journals such as Aviation Week and Space Technology.
The easily accessible information of U.So advancements when
contrasted with Soviet secrecy keeps the U.S. military
planners guessing.
5. Manpower
Sea Power magazine contends that in comparison to
the highly respected, well-paid Soviet Navy personnel, the
men of the U.S. Navy are economically and socially disadvan-
taged people of low esteem,. Other experts on the Soviet
Norman Polmar, "The Navy and the Nation," Sea Power
October 1973, p» 27.
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military such as John Erickson, noted professor of defense
studies, and Captain Sumner Shapiro, USN, a former assistant
U.S. Naval Attache to the U.S.S.R., present a detailed view
of the manpower situation in the armed forces of the U.S.S.R.
As a result of a revision to the law on military service in
196$, military service required of Russian citizens was
reduced from three years to two (except in the Navy) and the
grounds for deferment and exemption were expanded. This
presented some problems which were similar to those of the
All-Volunteer concept in the United States, and these issues
filled the Soviet military with some misgivings about com-
bat readiness. Marshall Grechko intended to deal with the
shortened term of service by placing more men in the reserves,
but the increased turnover rate placed an additional burden
on the training programs. Moreover, the current Soviet
recruit is better educated than in former years, and is less
inclined to believe all the ideology that the political
officer preaches. In his Naval Institute Proceedings
article, "The Blue Water Soviet Naval Officer," Captain
Shapiro relates the complications of the entry of the less
mature, better educated recruit on the naval scene. The
Navy's command structure with its intervening layers of
political officers creates serious leadership problems.
Soviet naval officers are expected to exert initiative
ft"?
John Erickson, "The Soviet Military, Soviet Policy




and imagination in performing their duties, but their control
over these younger recruits is diminished by the fact that
they share authority over them with the political officer.
Because political meetings occupy such a great part of the
naval officer's time, his concern for his men is often
lacking. Pressured by the need to perform within certain
limits in order to succeed, the Soviet naval officer shares
similar capabilities and deficiencies with his American
counterpart.
Recent studies of Soviet training and readiness by
John Erickson have revealed some interesting trends. Pres-
ently there are fewer and fewer military officers who have
had major operational experience, let alone wartime exposure.
Modern warfare situations pose an increased flow of infor-
mation due to multiple threats from high performance weaponry,
the result being less time to make decisions. Analysis of
Soviet exercise reports reveals the officer as a thorough
tactician, capable of assessing complex situations and formu-
lating correct operational judgments. The factor that he
seems to ignore is the cruciality of time in the success
of these operations under wartime conditions. Moreover,
this trend exists in the performance of officer-cadets under-
going military training. This weakness must be of concern
to the senior Soviet command leaders. The fact that many
senior military are investigating automation for utilization
in the command and control process indicates their awareness
of this vulnerability. Professor Erickson reports that the
i \

Soviet Navy has a more marked tendency towards this advanced
technology in the decision process in the context of modern
naval operations,
6. NATO/SEATO
The NATO alliance has undergone some political
changes in recent years. Extensive unilateral negotiations
conducted by the United States under the Nixon Doctrine
rankled European feelings both at the end of the Vietnam war
and throughout the Moscow and Peking summits. Combined
with the differences over domestic issues, these unilateral
efforts created ill feelings in the alliance that were often
made public. The Yom Kippur War support to Israel by the
United States added to the criticism of the European countries
who were dependent on Middle Eastern oil. The world-wide
alert which included 300,000 troops in Europe was perceived
as a possible reason for alliance members being added to
the list of countries affected by the oil embargo. During
the recent Mutual And Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) dis-
cussions which began in Geneva on October 1973, the European
allies were uneasy that a lessening of U.S. troop strength
was being considered. These MBFR talks were also the subject
of heated debate in the Congress where some groups pressed
for increased participation by members of the alliance.
Continued direct pressures such as this have caused European
John Erickson, "Training, Motivation and Morale: Some
Recent Soviet Views,'" RUSI Journal of the Royal United Services
Institute for Defense Studies
,
December 1973", pp. A-9-53.
37

nations to increase their proposed naval construction pro-
grams from 24 ships and 52 aircraft FY 1972 to the presently-
planned 9$ ships and 62 aircraft and patrol aircraft as well
as the new joint venture, the NATO guided missile hydrofoil.
Presently American naval forces comprise approximately 20$
of the combined NATO fleet. ^ The recent SALT-2 talks im-
passe has been considered to be a hopeful stimulus for a
return to solidarity in the alliance. However, until some
of the domestic dilemmas are stabilized or until a greater
threat to Europe presents itself, the European countries
will probably pursue independent courses.
The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)
appears to be headed for reduction from a military grouping
to a low key association with socio-economic emphasise The
Phillippines, Australia, and New Zealand have called SEATO
"obsolete" and "archaic," demanding a change in the mission
of the alliance "With the withdrawal of the military forces
from Vietnam, and similar domestic problems existing among
the nations of the organization, SEATO seems to be dissolving
as a viable defense group
7. Economic Factors
The Soviet naval presence in the Middle East does
seem to be part of an economic plan for future needs.
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
POD Authorizations 1974, Hearings Before the Committee on
Armed Services, 93rd Congress, 1st session, 1973 , 1: 174.
6S SEATO to Study Move Away from Military Emphasis,"
Monterey Peninsula Herald
,
28 September 1973, p. 8.
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Presently the Soviet Union is self-sufficient in the area
of petroleum production. By 1980 it is predicted that the
Soviets will rely in imports for a good percentage of their
oil supply. When the Black Sea oil fields are exhausted,
the oil reserves in central Siberia will be difficult to
exploit because of their distance from industrial centers
in Russia. Thus, good business dealings with the Arab oil
producing nations are essential to insure a plentiful supply
of oil until the Siberian potential can be developed.
Singapore and Malaysia are important to the Soviet economy
because of the locations they occupy on the trade routes in
the eastern Indian Ocean. Moscow has become one of the
largest purchasers of Malaysian rubber and is in need of
the dock and repair facilities in Singapore, the world's
fourth largest port. Even though Prime Minister Lee Kuan
Yew is a staunch anti-communist, economics requires cus-
tomers for the large port facilities formerly used by the
British Navy. Each year over 500 Russian cargo vessels
call at Singapore on their way from Vladivostock around
Africa to Odessa on the Black Sea Coast. This seaborne
part of the Soviet Union's internal trade network is
essential to the transport of bulk cargo to relieve the
overburdened Trans-Siberian railway system. With the Suez
Canal blocked since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the extra
9,000 mile transit leg around Africa has driven up shipping
costs. The economic savings of the reopening of the canal




easing of transit time for their Black Sea fleet to the
Indian Ocean.
The United States has similar economic interests
in the Middle East, Africa, and the Indian Ocean. In
addition to the increasing percentage of petroleum imports
from the Middle East, other raw materials from Africa are
vital to the industries of the U.S. The Indian Ocean sea
routes are imperative for access to strategic minerals in
Africa such as beryl, chromium ore, antimony, asbestos,
copper, columbium, lead, nickel and uranium. With economic
factors such as these exposed, the strategic importance of
. . - 67
sea power comes into fucus.
C. RISK AVOIDANCE NATURE/OPPORTUNISM
In his book Gunboat Diplomacy James Cable defines that
application of naval force as follows:
. o othe use or threat of limited naval force, other-
wise than as an act of war, in order to secure advan-
tage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of
an international dispute or else against foreign
nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction
of their own state D 68
Besides the gunboat diplomacy efforts in Ghana and Guinea
which were discussed earlier, a third incident involving a
Edward Hughes, "Soviet Strategy in the Indian Ocean,"
Readers Digest
,
April 1972, pp. 137-140.
Anthony Harrigan, "Security Interests in the Persian
Gulf and Western Indian Ocean," Strategic Review. l(Fall
1973): 19.
'
James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy
,
(New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1971), p. 21.
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West African state took place in May 1971, when a Soviet
Kashin class guided missile destroyer made a regular port
visit to Freetown, Sierra Leone. Concurrent with the arrival
of the warships was the declaration by its President, Siaka
Stevens, that Sierra Leone now was a republic. Many were
uncertain as to the legitimacy of Stevens' regime, but this
naval diplomacy with formalities and protocol exchanges com-
bined with the presence of the Soviet combatant to stabilize
the political situation. These political support maneuvers
undertaken by the Soviets are far from being aggressive efforts
to export Communism. They have been characterized by low key,
low military content features, and have been located in areas
not considered important to the West at the time. The
Soviets seemed to have experimented with these unopposed,
small scale interventions or projections of force, and in
every case the risk involved was minimal. This risk avoidance
nature has recently found the Soviet Union quick to negotiate
rather than chance prolonged nuclear confrontation, as in
the case of the U.S. alert in the Yom Kippur War, and also
during the case of the Iraq-Kuwait border dispute in early
1973. In spite of the fact that the Soviets supported the
traditionally hawkish Iraqis and did deploy a few warships
to the scene, the course and timing of negotiations and
events between the Soviet Union and Iraq have led Western
analysts to believe that the Soviets cooled the aggressive
fervor of the Iraqis. This adds significant weight to the
risk avoidance tendency of recent Soviet Naval strategy
since Iran and Saudi Arabis had announced their support
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for Kuwait's claim. It was not in the best interests of
the Soviets to allow a war to take place in the center of
world oil production, especially when they were relying on
69this supply in future years.
Opportunism is a characteristic often attributed to
strategies of the Soviet Union. Several incidents of Soviet
naval port visits have been dubiously linked by journalists
with political support actions, and later propagandized by
the Russians to take advantage of the faulty perception^,
Recent American efforts to negotiate a peace settlement in
the Middle East were also a form of opportunism, and the most
recent offer to assist in the clearance of the Suez Canal
and to provide $250 million in aid to Egypt, gave the UoS.
a chance to neutralize the remaining threat of the Soviet
Navy in Egypt. The utilization of the Iwo Jima with its
minesweeping RH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters in project
"Nimbus Star," was an attempt by the Navy to gain valuable
training in deactivating minefields and serve foreign policy
at the same time. The timing of these endeavors is hoped
to gain favor from the same Arab nations that voted against
them during the oil embargo of 1973-1974.
D. THIRD WORLD NATIONALISM AND BASE STABILITY
1. Desire for Independence
Xenophobia is defined as the hatred or dislike of
foreigners,, This word typifies the nationalistic attitude





of the emerging third world countries which ring the coasts
of Africa and the Indian Ocean. Most of these new independent
states have been dominated by monarchies or colonial powers
for centuries, and have only gained their independence in
the last two decades. At the outset of their forward deploy-
ment, when they were in need of base facilities to support
their Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean operations, the
Soviets took advantage of the Sixth Fleet interventions of
the 1950's to remind the Arab states of the dangers of
associations with the imperialistic and colonial powers. In
order to gain acceptance the Soviet Union promised and deliv-
ered military and economic aid to these young nations. The
establishment and subsequent expansion of forward deploy-
ment failed to evolve into the political conversion that the
Communists had hoped for.
Among the obstacles that the Soviet Union faced was
the unwillingness of the Arab states to surrender any sov-
ereignty to any foreign power regardless of their military
or economic assistance,, Another barrier was the strong anti-
communist sentiment of the Arab nations which was manifested
in repressions and harrassments of the Communists in Egypt,
Sudan, Iraq, and Libya. The generally accepted superiority
of Western technology and organizations over those of the
Soviet Union caused the Arab governments to deal with
"Western firms in spite of the diplomatic difficulties that
existed with the Western powers. A final hindrance to Soviet
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advances in the Middle East was the preponderance of Western
70trained and culturally oriented leaders in all disciplines.
These barriers resulted in a series of official
agreements which lacked the commitment that treaty organi-
zations carry. Soviet naval presence expanded in the Indian
Ocean as well, and as the United States perceived an increas-
ing threat to their interests and balance of power, the U.S.
Navy made plans to offset this imbalance. The American
plans to expand the support facilities of their base in
Diego Garcia triggered protests from the third world nations
in the area. India, as one of the primary supporters of a
1971 U.N. General Assembly resolution declaring the Indian
Ocean a zone of peace, has joined several other countries
in the area to demand that foreign warships be bannedo
Political realignment of former pro-American countries such
as Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia has resulted in their
protesting the U.S. initiative in Diego Garcia. With all of
the foreign aid India has received from the Soviet Union and
the friendship treaty too, her nationalistic feelings are
well expressed in this editorial comment from the Far Eastern
Economic Review :
By all accounts Mrs. Gandhi has been painfully aware
of the damage done to India's image by her apparent
diplomatic dependence on Moscow. She made frequent
public speeches denying the charge of dependence;
70George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East
,
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1971), pp. 161-162.
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she resisted Soviet pressure to provide base facil-
ities for the Soviet Navy; she tried to improve
relations with China by offering to send an ambas-
sador to Peking and by writing at least two letters
to Chou En-Lai. 71
2. Base Stability
A big question mark for the future of U.S. and
Soviet naval strategies is the stability of their overseas
bases. Both nations have experienced measurable embarrass-
ment and worry over incidents that have threatened their
ability to maintain their forces in certain forward areas.
During the Yom Kippur War when deployed strength was at
its peak, the United States Sixth Fleet was affected by the
oil embargo in several European ports. Normally reliable
suppliers in Singapore and the Philippines also cut off
deliveries to the Seventh Fleet as a result of the threat
levied by Saudi Arabia. In the Middle East where the U.S.
Navy had a base in Bahrain, the sheik had set a deadline for
the withdrawal of American forces, and later changed his
mind after the embargo was removed. Recent overtures to
Iceland by Soviets, which were magnified by the "Cod War"
between Iceland and Great Britain, have sent tremors through
the NATO alliance. The loss of the key link to NATO's sub-
marine defense barrier would be a strategic disaster for the
West „
The Soviets have shared these types of problems
with their overseas bases. The best example of this is the
71
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expulsion of the Soviets military advisers from Egypt in
July 1972. The refusal to give the Sadat regime certain
offensive weapons has been labeled the primary reason; how-
ever, the less publicized Russian cultural prejudice for the
Arabs may have been significant too. Numerous disagreements
and altercations between Soviet advisers and Egyptian mili-
tary units caused the Egyptian military leaders to pressure
72Sadat for their removal. The refusal of countries like
Guinea and India to allow the Soviet naval forces to estab-
lish their own bases, emphasizes the nationalistic nature of
the countries involved. With the memory of the expulsion
from Egypt where they have spent billions of dollars in
assistance that probably will not be repaid, the Soviets
will undoubtedly be reluctant to become involved or committed
again. The United States realized the seriousness of the
basing problem when conducting the recent airlift of arms
and supplies to Israel during the Yom Kippur War. Of all
the NATO allies, only Portugal would allow staging for the
round-the-clock logistics flight So In a speech to the
Jacksonville, Florida chapter of the Navy League, Admiral
Thomas Moorer remarked:
If only one element of deterrence is our ability
to respond rapidly to conflict in faraway places,
then we must consider the need for forward-basing
U.S. air, ground, and sea forces in areas where
72




our important interests may be altered by military
or political compulsions beyond our control. 73
E. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTOR ANALYSIS—AN EXAMPLE
Using the Soviet Navy's forward deployment as an example
how might this policy analysis be integrated in currently
used analytic procedures? When making assumptions for
investigations several questions should be considered.
Is the capability or action being studied, by itself,
enough to base an assumption of intentions on? Some con-
siderations in trying to answer this question are the timing
of the decision to follow a course of action or develop a
capability, and who or what else is related to the maneuver
or technological advancement. The timing of the Cuban
missile crisis in 1962 certainly enhanced the formulation
of the Soviet's policy of forward deployment if it did not,
in fact, cause it. Soviet naval presence in the Indian
Ocean threatens the oil supply lines to the West, but it
also serves to gain the support of nations such as India in
the event of a war with China.
What are the possible additional needs that may be the
outgrowth of these moves or improvements? In the course of
deploying their fleets to all of the world ocean areas, the
needs for additional air bases, support facilities, and a
mobile logistics capability emerged.





Was the occurrence or policy change an independent
action or a competitive reaction? Determining this can
provide significant understanding of the intentions of
another power. The projection of Soviet naval forces into
the Eastern Mediterranean in reaction to the intervention
potential and strategic nuclear threat of the Sixth Fleet
was followed by a similar naval presence in the Indian Ocean
to gain an alliance with India to counter the Chinese
menace.
What are the consequences of overestimation or under-
estimation of this strategy? Overestimation of the Soviet
Navy's strength in the Mediterranean can provide an effec-
tive propaganda base for covering up some of its weaknesses
or shortcomings. The ouster of Soviet military and technical
advisors from Egypt and the loss of the vitally needed air-
fields in July 1972 revealed such a weakness. On the other
hand, the underestimation of U.S„ naval capability in the
Mediterranean combined with the overestimation of the
Soviet Navy's potential can reduce the confidence or morale
of U.S. forces in a real confrontation as well as affect
or bias subsequent analyses.
The goal of this comprehensive method of analysis is
to gain balance and realism in the United States' appraisals
of naval strategy. The need for considering these other
factors is being realized today. In recent Naval War College
war games, top-level State Department officials who acted
as umpires in the games controlled the escalation of
93

involvement through the injection of politics. This
new approach to the training of the Navy's future policy
makers and strategists emphasized the demand for more com-
prehensive analysis of naval strategy.
7' L. Computers, Movie Projectors Add Realism to War
Games," Monterey Peninsula Herald
,





Blackman, Raymond V.B., ed., Janets Fighting Ships 1971-72
,
London: Sampson Low Marston & Co., LTD., 1971.
Blackman, Raymond V.B., ed., Jane"s Fighting Ships 1972-73
»
London: Sampson Low Marston & CoT, LTD., 1972.
Blechman, Barry M. , The Changing Soviet Navy
,
Washington:
The Brookings Institution, 1973
•
Breyer, Siegfried, Guide to the Soviet Navy
,
Annapolis:
United States Naval Institute, 1970.
Cable, James, Gunboat Diplomacy
,
New York: Praeger Publishers,
1971.
Carrison, Daniel J., The United States Navy
,
New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1968.
Eller, Ernest McNeill, RADM USN (ret.), The Soviet Sea-
Challenge
, New York: Cowles Book Co., Inc., 1971 >
Enthoven, Alain C. and Smith, K. Wayne, How Much is Enough?
New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971o
Fulbright , Senator J. Wo, The Pentagon Propaganda Machine
,
New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1^70.
Herrick, Robert Waring, Soviet Naval Strategy
,
Annapolis:
United States Naval Institute, 1968.
Jukes, Geoffrey, The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy
,
London: International Institute for Strategic Studies,
1972.
Kemp, P. K., ed., History of the Royal Navy
,
New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1969.
Kuzmack, Arnold M. , Naval Force Levels and Modernization
,
Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1971.
Lenczowski, George, Soviet Advances in the Middle East
,
Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1971.
Proxmire, William, Uncle Sam-—The Last of the Bigtime Spenders
,
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972.







Sanders, Ralph, The Politics of Defense Analysis , New York:
Dunellen Publishing Co., Inc., 1973.
Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context
,
Halifax:
Centre for Foreign Studies, Department of Political
Science, Dalhousie University, 1972.
Soviet Naval Developments , Halifax: Centre for Foreign
Studies, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie
University, 1973.
Soviet Sea Power , Washington: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Georgetown University, Special
Report Series, no. 10, June 1969.
Wolfe, Thomas W., Soviet Naval Interaction with the United
States and It's Influence on Soviet Naval Development
,
Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1972.
Magazines
Alikov, P., "Another American Base on Italian Soil," Morskoi
Sbornik
,
No. 3, October 1973, pp. 97-98.
Aspaturian, Vernon D., "The USSR, the USA and China in the
Seventies," Military Review, January 1974, pp. 50-63.
Booda, Larry L., "ASW—Challenges and Bold Solutions," Sea
Technology
,
November 1973, pp. 24-27.
Bringle, W. F., Admiral USN, "The Challenge Posed by the
Soviet Navy," Journal of the Royal United Services
Institute for Defence Studies
,
June 1973, pp. 11-16.




De Borchgrave, Arnaud, "A Mediterranean Tide Runs for the
Russians," Newsweek
,
July 19, 1971, pp. 34-35.




"Egypt: The Honeymoon is Over," Newsweek , July 31, 1972
pp. 26-28.
Englehardt, Tom, "The New Half-Nelson," Far Eastern Economic
Review
,
April 9, 1973, ppo 25-28.
Erickson, John, "The Soviet Military, Soviet Policy and
Soviet Politics," Strategic Review l(Fall 1973): 23-26.
101

Erickson, John, "Training, Motivation and Morale: Some
Recent Soviet Views," Journal of the Royal United Services
Institute for Defence Studies , December 1973 , pp. 49—53
»
Fromm, Joseph, "If Suez Canal is Opened—Meaning to UoS. and
Russia," U.S. News and World Report , December 24, 1973
pp. 27-28.
Funkhouser, John T., "Soviet Carrier Strategy," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, December 1973, pp. 27-37.
Gilmore, Kenneth 0., "Soviet Submarines: New Challenge
from Cuba," Reader's Digest , May 1971, pp. 63-67.




Griswold, Lawrence, "Winds of Change on the Gondwana Plateau,"
Sea Power , March 1974, pp. 28-34.
Hagan, Kenneth J. and Kipp, Jacob W., "U.S. and USSR Naval
Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , November
1973, pp. 38-44.
Harrigan, Anthony, "Security Interests in the Persian Gulf
and Western Indian Ocean," Strategic Review 1 (Fall
1973): 13-22.
Hessman, James D., "New Realities and the Soviet Sea Strategy,"
Sea Power , December 1973-January 1974, pp. 21-26.
Hessman, James D., "New Ship Programs: Trade-Off Between
the Present and the Future," Armed Forces Journal
,
April 1972, p. 30.
Hessman, James D. and Kopec, Bernadine M«, "Sea Service/
Maritime Programs Fare Well in FY 1975 Budget," Sea
Power
,
March 1974, pp. 13-19.
Hughes, Edward, "Soviet Strategy in the Indian Ocean," Reader's
Digest , April 1972, pp. 137-140.
,
"India's Strait jacket ," Far Eastern Economic Review
,
December
10, 1973, p. 5.
Johnson, Katherine, "House Group Backs Diego Garcia Base,"
Aviation Week and Space Technology
, April 1, 1974, p. 18.
"Key Area Where U.S. is Shipping," U.S. News and World Report
,
March 20, 1972, pp. 38-41.
Kidd, Isaac D., Admiral USN, "View from the Bridge of the
Sixth Fleet Flagship," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
,




Kucherov, Alex, "A Look at U.S. -Soviet Rivalry in the




Luns, Dr. Joseph M. A. H., "Prospects for the Alliance,"
NATO Review , No. 1 1974, pp. 3-7.
MccGwire, Michael, "Russian Maritime Requirements," Journal
of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence
Studies
,
December 1973, pp. 59-65.
McLean, D. B. G., "The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean,"
Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for
Defence Studies
,
rJec"embe"r i'973, pp. 59-65.
Marriot, John, "The Situation in the Mediterranean," Nato's
Fifteen Nations
, Oct. -Nov., 1971, pp. 82-89.
"New Ship Mix Will Test CNO's Bid for New Naval Strategy,"
Armed Forces Journal, February 1974, p. 74.




"President's State of the Union Address," Commander's Digest
,
February 3, 1972, pp. 1-3
Prina, L. Edgar, "Hicks Panel Hits 'Permissiveness,' Lack
of Discipline," Sea Power , March 1973, pp 35-38 c
Prina, L. Edgar, "A Tale of Two Islands," Sea Power , March
1974, pp. 36-38.
Robinson, Clarence A., Jr., "Navy Plans Fully Guided Harpoon
Tests," Aviation Week and Space Technology , February,
25, 1974, pp. 32-35.
Robinson, Clarence A., Jr., "Sea Control Ship Tests Advanced
ASW," Aviation Week and Space Technology , February 11,
1974, pP o 43-48.
"Russia Drives East of Suez," Newsweek , January 18, 1971,
pp. 27-32.
Shapiro, Sumner, Captain, USN, "The Blue Water Soviet Naval
Officer," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , February
1971, pp 19-26.
"Soviets Test New MIRV Warhead ICBM's," Aviation Week and
Space Technology
,
February 25, 1974, p. 20.






"Suez Canal—Key to Soviet Strategy in the Mid East," U.S.
News and World Report , June 22, 1970, pp. 22-24.
"The Desert and the Sea," Sea Power
,
November 1973, p. 4.
"The Eagle Challenges the Tomcat," Business Week , May 12,
1973, p. 51.
I
"The Navy's Changing Role in the Far East," U.So News and
World Report, April 17, 1972, pp. 76-79.
Turner, Stansfield, Vice Admiral USN, "Missions of the U.S.
Navy," Naval War College Review , March-April 1974,
pp. 2-17
•
Vigor, P. H.,"The Soviet View of Australia and New Zealand,"






"Where Russian Threat Keeps Growing," U.S. News and World
Report
,
September 13, 1971, pp. 72-77.
Zumwalt, Admiral Elmo R., Jr., USN, "Strategic Importance
of Indian Ocean," Armed Forces Journal , April 1974,
pp. 28-29.
Newspapers
"Computers, Movie Projectors Add Realism to War Games,"
Monterey Peninsula Herald
,
23 May 1974, p. 5.
Deweerd, Harvey A., "Beware if Detente Gets too Chummy,"
Los Angeles Times
, 13 January 1974, part 6, p. 1.
"Moorer Tells Arab War Lessons," Navy Times
,
22 May 1974, p. 13
"More that 5,000 Tactical Planes not 'Ready' Pentagon Says,"
Monterey Peninsula Herald , 25 March 1974, p. 7.
"MSC Role Growing as Fleet Supplier," Navy Times , 2 May, 1973,
p. 26.
"Navy Announces Ship Transfers," Monterey Peninsula Herald
,
30 March 1974.
"Navy's Greece Home Port Okayed," Navy Times , 14 November
1973, p. 23.
"Navy Planning Ships that Skim the Surface," Los Angeles
Times , 27 May 1973, part 1, pp. 2-6.
"Oil Cutoff Means Less Flight, Steaming Time," Navy Times
,
28 November 1973, p. 22.
104

"Russian Navy Has Trouble Getting Ships," Los Angeles Times
,
1 April 1973, p. 10.
"SEATO To Study Move away from Military Emphasis," Monterey
Peninsula Herald
,
28 November 1973, p. 8.
"Soviets Seek West African Naval Base for Patrols of Atlantic
Lanes," Monterey Peninsula Herald
,
31 January 1974, p. 40,
Miscellaneous
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (0P-100D). "FY 74
Fleet Staff Reduction and Reorganization," Paper used
for briefing, 16 July 1973.
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, POD
Appropriations 1974, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of




U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, POD
Authorizations 1974, Hearings Before the Committee on
Armed Services
,
93rd Congress, 1st session, 1973.
U. S. Congress, Senate, Statement of Secretary of Pefense
Melvin R. Laird Before the Senate Armed Services Com-







1« Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314








4. Professor J. W. Creighton, Code 55Cf (advisor) 1




5. LCDR Robert Branco, USN 1
8$07 Willow Oak Road
Baltimore, Maryland 21234
6. LCDR D. Lo Abbey, USN (second reader) Code -£S"Ay 1




7. U. S. Naval "War College 1































3 2768 002 07188 8
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
